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A Wall of Hate
EMINENT DOMAIN AND INTEREST-CONVERGENCE
Philip Lee†
INTRODUCTION
“On day one, we will begin working on an impenetrable,
physical, tall, powerful, beautiful southern border
wall.”1—Donald Trump
Donald Trump is no stranger to eminent domain.2 In the
1990s, Trump wanted land around Trump Plaza to build a
limousine parking lot.3 Many of the private owners agreed to
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under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 License. Please contact the
author directly for reprint permission.
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Murray, Sue Lee, and Marc Johnson for their comments on earlier drafts of this article,
the UDC Law faculty for their feedback during a faculty scholarship presentation, and
John Jensen for his research assistance. I would also like to thank the editors of the
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1 Donald Trump, Campaign speech in Phoenix, AZ (Aug. 31, 2016)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/trump-says-he-will-build-impenetrable-
physical-tall-powerful-beautiful-border/2016/08/31/34eceacc-6fb6-11e6-993f-73c693a898
20_video.html?utm_term=.b0c2b78beef1 [https://perma.cc/D2CJ-ZZ52]. For a full
transcript of the speech, see Rishi Iyengar,Real Donald Trump’s Speech on Immigration,
TIME (Sept. 1, 2016, 1:52 AM ET), http://time.com/4475349/donald-trumps-speech-
immigration-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/CX3M-MGG8].
2 See, e.g., Jim Geraghty, Donald Trump: “Eminent Domain is Wonderful,”
NAT’L REV., (Oct. 7, 2015, 7:50 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/425212/
donald-trump-eminent-domain-wonderful-jim-geraghty [https://perma.cc/53NJ-VS5W];
David Sherfinski,Donald Trump: “I Think Eminent Domain is Wonderful,”WASH. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/7/donald-trump-i-think-
eminent-domain-wonderful/ [https://perma.cc/H53Y-ZHPC]. Although “eminent domain”
is not mentioned in in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth
Amendment as a provision that limits government eminent domain power. See, e.g., Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005) (referring to a city’s ability “to
acquire . . . property [for a public use] from unwilling owners in exchange for just
compensation” under the Takings Clause as “the power of eminent domain”).
3 David Boaz, Donald Trump’s Eminent Domain Love Nearly Cost a Widow Her
House, GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/
19/donald-trumps-eminent-domain-nearly-cost-widow-house [https://perma.cc/5Z6H-TV2N].
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sell, but one elderly widow and two brothers who owned a small
business refused.4 Trump then got a government agency—the
Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA)—to take
the properties through eminent domain, offering them a quarter
of what they had previously paid or been offered for their land.5
The property owners fought back and finally won.6
Although the CRDA named several justifications, from economic
development to traffic alleviation and additional green space,7
the New Jersey Superior Court found there were not “sufficient
assurances that the properties to be condemned will be used for
the public purposes cited to justify their acquisition.”8 In
reaching its result, the court noted that the legality of a
government taking “may . . . turn upon an assessment of the
consequences and effects of the proposed project.”9 The court
refused to give significant deference to the government agency’s
4 Id.
5 Id. Boaz writes of the CRDA’s offers:
CRDA offered [Vera Coking, an elderly widow] $250,000 for the property—one-
fourth of what another hotel builder had offered her a decade earlier. When
she turned that down, the agency went into court to claim her property under
eminent domain so that Trump could pave it and put up a parking lot. Peter
Banin and his brother owned another building on the block. A fewmonths after
they paid $500,000 to purchase the building for a pawn shop, CRDA offered
them $174,000 and told them to leave the property. A Russian immigrant,
Banin said: “I knew they could do this in Russia, but not here. I would
understand if they needed it for an airport runway, but for a casino?”
Id.
6 Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1998). Note that the landowners in Banin were represented by Institute for Justice.
Atlantic City Condemnation—Vera Coking, INST. FOR JUSTICE, https://ij.org/case/casino-
reinvestment-development-authority-v-coking/ [https://perma.cc/8CQC-Y3KP]. The
Institute for Justice is the same non-profit libertarian public interest law firm that later
represented the landowners in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which
will be discussed later in the article. See supra section I.D.2.
7 Banin, 727 A.2d at 104–05. CRDA gave the following justifications related
to the public benefit for its taking of private property:
•the development of additional hotel rooms in Atlantic City dedicated to
housing conventioneers using the new Convention Center
•redevelopment of a portion of the Corridor Area
•the construction of additional parking
•the alleviation of traffic congestion in the Corridor Area
•establishment of a park—green space—in Atlantic City
•creation of new permanent hospitality industry and short-term construction
industry jobs
•promotion of the tourist and convention industries.
Id.at 104–05.
8 Id. at 108, 111.
9 Id. at 104 (citations omitted).
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determination that the public purpose would be satisfied.
Instead, it evaluated the government’s claims on its own and
found them lacking.
This heightened scrutiny is generally absent in federal
court decisions interpreting the scope of public use for eminent
domain power.10 This lack of federal fetter on eminent domain is
troubling because of President Trump’s promises to build a
border wall between the United States and Mexico.11 Trump
instigated chants of “build a wall!” at his campaign rallies,12
issued an executive order concerning the wall within his first
days in office,13 and shut down the government over border wall
funding.14 Construction of Trump’s proposed border wall
commenced in late September 2017.15 In November 2017, Trump
requested additional resources to hire government attorneys to
handle eminent domain cases in the coming year.16 After failing
10 See infra Part II. Note, however, that Kelo suggests that heightened scrutiny
should be applied to pretextual takings where the stated reason is public use, but the actual
reason is private benefit, yet the Court provides no standards on how to perform such
analysis. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (“Nor would the City be
allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual
purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”). In this article, I argue for heightened judicial
scrutiny in all eminent domain challenges before a court, not just for pretextual takings.
11 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, David E. Sanger & Maggie Haberman, Trump to
Order Mexican Border Wall and Curtail Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24. 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/wall-border-trump.html [https://perma.cc/
Q8AJ-M3UW] (“The border wall was a signature promise of Mr. Trump’s campaign, during
which he argued it is vital to gaining control over the illegal flow of immigrants into the
United States.”).
12 See Kelly Wallace & Sandee LaMotte, The Collateral Damage After
Students’ ‘Build a Wall’ Chant Goes Viral, CNN (Dec. 28, 2016, 11:10 AM ET),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/28/health/build-a-wall-viral-video-collateral-damage-
middle-school/index.html [https://perma.cc/QE75-JDMC].
13 See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
14 See Carl Hulse, Trump Fences Himself in with Border Wall Spending Threat,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/us/politics/trump-wall-
government-shutdown-congress.html [https://perma.cc/E4D5-FKQV] (noting that Trumphas
left little room for negotiation with his threats to shut down the government if Congress does
not approve funding for his border wall); Martin Pengelly and Jamiles Lartey,TrumpClaims
Plan to End Longest Government Shutdown in History, THEGUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2019, 12:02
EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/12/donald-trump-government-shut
down-border-wall-democrats [https://perma.cc/F5Q6-6BE2]; Jacob Pramuk, Trump: I’m
Building the Wall, CNBC (Aug. 23, 2017, 2:00 PM ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/22/
trump-says-hes-willing-to-shut-down-the-government-to-get-his-border-wall.html [https://
perma.cc/H6B3-GPEW] (noting that Trump said at a rally in Arizona, “If we have to close
down our government, we’re building that wall.”).
15 See Stephen Dinan, Trump Border Wall Construction Begins, WASH. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/sep/26/trump-border-
wall-construction-begins/ [https://perma.cc/J8U3-P283].
16 SeeTal Kopan,TrumpAdmin Taking Quiet Steps on Seizing Border Land, Report
Says, CNN (Nov. 13, 2017, 7:56 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/13/politics/border-wall-
eminent-domain/index.html [https://perma.cc/7SHU-C457] (noting that a report produced by
Democrats on the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee on eminent
domainand theborderwall detailing theTrumpadministration’s request for 2018, “which seeks
424 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:2
to secure federal funding for his border wall for over a year,
Trump partially shut down the government in December 2018.17
Ending on January 25, 2019, this shutdown became the longest
in U.S. history.18
Although about 650 miles of border fencing were already
constructed in 1990,19 the proposedwall would be bothmuch longer
andmuchmore massive. According to the executive order, “wall” is
not just fencing, but “a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly
secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier.”20 The wall
would also span the entire “‘Southern border’ . . . including all
points of entry.”21 The southern border encompasses roughly two
thousand miles.22 It stretches across the states of California,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.23 Two-thirds of the land along
this border is private, state-owned, or tribal land, while only about
one-third is owned by the federal government.24
an additional [twelve] [Justice Department] attorneys for $2 million . . . to handle land
acquisition cases”).
17 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Katie Rogers, Government Shutdown to Continue
for Days as Senate Adjourns Until Thursday, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/22/us/politics/shutdown-trump-senate.html [https://
perma.cc/YVH8-DY6L].
18 See Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gates & Karen Zraick, The Government
Shutdown Was the Longest Ever. Here’s the History, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019) https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government-shutdown.html
[https://perma.cc/D5NM-VMAS]
19 See Astrid Galvan & Brian Skoloff, Donald Trump’s Wall Plan Draws Mixed
Reactions on the Border, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://apnews.com/
08ea2fca2c7b4fe880d6110f3c00978f/mixed-reactions-trumps-border-wall-along-arizona-
border [https://perma.cc/B248-TL26] (“There are already about 650 miles of fencing,
including the steel fence that divides the sister cities of Nogales in Arizona and Mexico
and ranges from [eighteen] feet to [twenty-six] feet tall.”); Julia Jacobo & Serena
Marshall,Nearly 700Miles of Fencing at the US-Mexico Border Already Exist, ABCNEWS
(Jan. 26, 2017, 6:38 AM ET), http://abcnews.go.com/US/700-miles-fencing-us-mexico-
border-exist/story?id=45045054 [https://perma.cc/F5D3-HAT8] (“The types of fencing
includes [sic] wire mesh, chain link, post and rail, sheet piling, concrete barriers for
vehicles and X-shaped steel beams for livestock.”).
20 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793, 8,794 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also
Trump to Reporter: ‘It’s Not a Fence, It’s a Wall; We’re Gonna Start Building’, FOXNEWS
(Jan. 11, 2017, 12:36 PM), http://insider.foxnews.com/2017/01/11/trump-reporter-its-not-
fence-its-wall-and-were-not-going-wait [https://perma.cc/4DQ9-78WQ] (“Trump pushed
back on recent reports that U.S. taxpayers will have to foot the bill upfront, rather than
Mexico. The president-elect first corrected the reporter, who referred to it as a ‘border
fence.’ ‘It’s not a fence, it’s a wall. You just misreported it,’ he said.”).
21 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793, 8,794.
22 John Burnett, Southern Border Wall: Campaign Slogan Meets Reality, NPR
(Jan. 23, 2017, 5:01 AM ET), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/23/511165471/southern-
border-wall-campaign-slogan-meets-reality [https://perma.cc/C68U-ABZ8].
23 Sarah Almukhter & Josh Williams, Trump Wants a Border Wall. See What’s
in Place Already., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/
02/05/us/border-wall.html [http://perma.cc/UT3R-QML5].
24 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-399, SOUTHWEST BORDER:
ISSUESRELATED TOPRIVATEPROPERTYDAMAGE 5 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/
669936.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LAQ-25RK] (“Additionally, the area along the southwest
border is composed of federal, state, tribal, and private lands; federal and tribal lands
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A major obstacle to building the wall besides the price,25
which Mexico is not going to pay,26 is the property rights of the
private landowners and Native American tribes who occupy the
land.27 For those who refuse to sell their property to the federal
government, under cases like Kelo v. City of New London, the
government will be able to take it through the power of eminent
domain with little check on its power.28
This article is about the interest-convergence thesis,
which posits that civil rights gains are made possible when the
interests of racial minorities converge with the interests of the
white majority.29 Interest-convergence is a useful theoretical tool
in analyzing the controversy surrounding the proposed border
wall because it highlights overlapping interests between many
different racial groups that otherwise may be missed. As such,
this article argues that we are in a unique historical moment in
which the interests of minority and majority racial groups have
converged to push for heightened scrutiny in legal challenges to
federal government takings of private land. In particular, racial
minorities have an interest in increasing and maintaining their
home ownership as a civil rights matter, while white people have
an interest in limiting the power of government to take their
homes from a property rights perspective.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an
overview of Professor Derrick Bell’s influential interest-
convergence thesis. This Part also introduces the public use
doctrine, in addition to a new idea of micro- and macro-level
interest-convergence to explain what appears to be civil rights
make up 632 miles, or approximately 33 percent, of the nearly 2,000 total border miles.
Private and state-owned lands constitute the remaining 67 percent of the border, most
of which is located in Texas.”).
25 See Peter Baker & Jennifer Steinhauer, Wall ‘Will Get Built,’ Trump Says,
as He Drops Funding Demand, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/25/us/politics/mexico-wall-spending-trump.html [https://perma.cc/L32D-F2QJ]
(“Mr. Trump initially estimated during the campaign that the wall would cost $12 billion,
but the figure has soared since then. A Department of Homeland Security internal report
in February estimated that the wall could cost about $21.6 billion. A new report issued
by the Senate Democrats last week put the cost far higher, at nearly $70 billion.”).
26 Azam Ahmed,Mexico’s President Cancels Meeting with Trump Over Wall, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/world/mexicos-president-
cancels-meeting-with-trump-over-wall.html [https://perma.cc/8GC2-5WZ6]; Ayesha Rascoe,
In Blustery Call, Trump Pressured Mexico on Border Wall Payment, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2017,
9:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump/in-blustery-call-trump-pressured-
mexico-on-border-wall-payment-idUSKBN1AJ20F [https://perma.cc/N26E-WX8Q].
27 In addition, the state-owned land poses an issue. However, the many issues
of federalism this invokes is beyond the scope of this article. I will focus, instead, on the
potential takings from private parties and Native American tribes.
28 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005).
29 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Educ. and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
426 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:2
gains in the property realm when broader interests between
majority and minority racial groups have not converged, but
more individualized interests have. Part II applies a racial
reinterpretation of the three cases—Berman,Midkiff, and Kelo—
that created a broad, deferential interpretation of public use to
show that minority and majority racial interests have converged
on a macro-level around reforming federal eminent domain law.
This Part highlights the racial dimension of important Supreme
Court cases that, on first take, appear race-neutral. Finally, Part
III suggests some possible ways forward by focusing on ways to
challenge the federal government’s takings power with various
forms of heightened judicial scrutiny. Part III argues that the
time is ripe to pursue such alternatives because we are in a
moment of macro-level interest-convergence.
I. THE INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THESIS AND PROPERTY
THEORY
A. The Interest-Convergence Thesis
In a highly influential comment in the Harvard Law
Review titled Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, legal scholar Derrick Bell, Jr. was in
search of a principle that would explain the civil rights victory
in Brown v. Board of Education.30 Bell’s piece was in response to
an article by Professor Herbert Wechsler which argues that the
proper role of the courts is to decide cases on a neutral principle
that would be applicable to other cases.31 Wechsler then
questions the constitutional legitimacy of Brown because,
instead of neutral grounds, he argues that the case is really
based on conflicting associational rights between African
Americans and white people.32 Bell, in response, rejects both
30 Id.
31 Id. at 520–21; see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (“To be sure, the courts decide, or
should decide, only the case they have before them. But must they not decide on grounds
of adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by
others that the principles imply? Is it not the very essence of judicial method to insist
upon attending to such other cases, preferably those involving an opposing interest, in
evaluating any principle avowed?”).
32 Wechsler, supra note 31, at 34. (“Given a situation where the state must
practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who wish it or
imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding
that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?”).
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associational rights33 and racial equality34 as the principles that
undergirded Brown. Bell explains an alternative thesis that
would encompass a generally applicable principle: “Translated
from judicial activity in racial cases both before and after Brown,
this principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: The interest of
blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only
when it converges with the interests of whites.”35 In other words,
civil rights gains will only be made when the interest of racial
minorities overlaps with the interest of white people. Bell
elaborates, “Racial remedies may . . . be the outward
manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious judicial
conclusions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance,
or at least not harm societal interests deemed important by
middle- and upper-class whites.”36 Bell then identifies three
points of broad convergence between minority and majority
interests in Brown. First, the decision was instrumental for
white government officials and others in countering Communist
propaganda aimed at third world countries that critiqued the
racism of American society.37 Second, Brown offered reassurance
to the returning African American veterans of WorldWar II, who
had sacrificed so much fighting for the ideals of American
democracy, that while their country had its racial problems, it
was at least moving in the direction of equality.38 Third, the
decision was a boon to white Americans in the South who viewed
racial segregation “as a barrier to further industrialization” and
a more prosperous economy.39 Based on these three aspects of
overlapping minority and white interests, the civil rights victory
in Brown was made possible. Interest-convergence is a useful
tool that helps explain why civil rights progress has been
33 Bell, supra note 29, at 522 (“To doubt that racial segregation is harmful to
blacks, and to suggest that what blacks really sought was the right to associate withwhites,
is to believe in a world that does not exist now and could not possibly have existed then.”).
34 Id. at 523. (Bell argues “that the availability of fourteenth amendment
protection in racial cases may not actually be determined by the character of harm
suffered by blacks or the quantum of liability proved against whites.”).
35 Id.
36 Id. A substantial body of research has arisen in recent years on the concept
of subconscious bias in the law. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, et al., A Matter of Fit: The
Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389 (2007);
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969
(2006); Annika L. Jones, Comment, Implicit Bias as Social-Framework Evidence in
Employment Discrimination, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1221 (2017); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane,
Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLAL. REV. 465 (2010);
Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U.
CIN. L. REV. 97 (2010); L. Elizabeth Sarine, Regulating the Social Pollution of Systemic
Discrimination Caused by Implicit Bias, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1359 (2012).
37 Bell, supra note 29, at 524.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 525.
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possible, even when the history of racial oppression in this
country would suggest otherwise.
Interest-convergence, however, has been vigorously
contested in the academy. One of the most powerful critiques is
by legal scholar Justin Driver.40 Driver argues that interest-
convergence suffers a number of analytical weaknesses. First, the
theory has an “overly broad conceptualization” of the uniformity
of what constitutes a “black interest[ ] ” and a “white interest[ ] .”41
In response, Driver over-complicates Bell’s theory by questioning
the epistemological foundations of racialized knowledge. Insofar
as racial minorities have beenmistreated in this society, however,
the broad “black interest” would simply entail creating a society
without this mistreatment.42 Second, Driver contends that the
theory “incorrectly suggests that the racial status of [African
Americans]” is characterized by continuity instead of change and
takes issue with the theory’s lack of recognition of the agency of
two groups of people who have played a significant role in civil
rights gains—African American citizens and white judges.43 In
response, if interest-convergence is viewed partially as a
historical methodology, then Driver’s attacks are flawed.44 In
other words, if Bell is describing how Brown happened, then his
analysis is useful because its characterization of the continuity of
racism and central role of white decision makers in maintaining
the status quo is historically accurate. Thus, if Bell appears to be
creating a dichotomy of African American interests versus white
interests, assuming that racism is a fixture in American society,
as well as downplaying the agency of individual actors in a
racially oppressive system and looking for racial explanations of
seemingly positive developments, then it is because this is how he
explains the decision that ended Jim Crow. Finally, Driver
criticizes the irrefutable nature of the theory—specifically, how it
frames “egalitarian judicial decisions” as “necessary concessions
to . . . maintain white [supremacy]” or simply “ignore[s] them
altogether.”45 In response, as Driver’s article demonstrates, no
theory is irrefutable. If Bell ignored certain cases in his analysis,
40 See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. 149 (2011).
41 Id. at 156.
42 See Lahny R. Silva, Ringing the Bell: The Right Counsel and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, 82 MO. L. REV. 133, 146–48 (2017) (applying interest-convergence
to the right to counsel in criminal law).
43 See Driver, supra note 40, at 156–57.
44 See Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: Understanding the Interest-
Convergence Thesis, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 248, 252–58 (2012).
45 See Driver, supra note 40, at 157.
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scholars like Driver will surely highlight these gaps and continue
to ask questions about its explanatory power.
Even taking Driver’s critique seriously, interest-
convergence maintains theoretical utility for explaining civil
rights gains. Indeed, Bell’s thesis has been applied to many
different minority groups. For example, it has been used to
analyze how Mexican Americans were able to successfully
contest their legalized exclusion from juries,46 how Japanese
Americans were able to win reparations for the World War II
internment camps,47 how sexual minorities were able to secure
marriage equality,48 and how many other groups achieved civil
rights gains.49 Interest-convergence has also been applied to
different areas of law.50 In all of these analyses, the interest of
minority groups in achieving equality and fair treatment
overlapped with the interests of the majority group.
46 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay, Hernandez v. Texas and the
Interest Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 63 (2006) (applying interest-
convergence toMexicanAmericans and the case that struck down their exclusion from juries).
47 SeeRhonda V.Magee, Note,TheMaster’s Tools from the BottomUp: Responses
to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse,
79 VA. L. REV. 863, 908–09 (1993) (applying interest-convergence to Japanese Americans
and their fight for reparations for the World War II internment camps).
48 See Neo Khuu, Comment, Obergefell v. Hodges: Kinship Formation, Interest
Convergence, and the Future of LGBTQ Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 184, 215–16 (2017).
49 See Maria Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina
Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETONHALLL. REV. 1373, 1377 (2005)
(applying interest-convergence to undocumented minority students and their fight for
educational access); Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the
Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L.
REV. 311, 330–31 (2009) (applying interest-convergence to people with disabilities and
their fight for inclusion); Charles R. Venator-Santiago,ColdWar Civil Rights: The Puerto
Rican Dimension, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 423, 431 (2012) (applying interest-convergence
to Puerto Ricans and their struggle for self-governance).
50 See, e.g., Bryan L. Adamson, The H’aint in the (School) House: The Interest
Convergence Paradigm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 CAL. W. L.
REV. 173, 185–99 (2006) (applying interest-convergence to school finance reform in
education law); Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law:
A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 282–
84 (1996) (applying interest-convergence to immigration law); Stephen M. Feldman,
Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 81
IOWA L. REV. 833, 871–72 (1996) (book review applying interest-convergence to religious
freedom law); Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After
Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J. 937, 940 (2005)
(applying interest-convergence to alternative dispute resolution in employment
discrimination law); Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory
Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 939 (2007) (applying interest-
convergence to the cultural defense in criminal law); Sudha Setty, National Security
Interest Convergence, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 185, 209–10 (2012) (applying interest-
convergence to advocate for single-issue coalitions in national security law); Silva, supra
note 42, at 148 (applying interest-convergence to the right to counsel in criminal law);
Kevin K. Washburn, A Different Kind of Symmetry, 34 N.M. L. REV. 263, 286–87 (2004)
(applying interest-convergence to recognition of tribal sovereignty in Indian Law).
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Furthermore, this theory has applicability when looking
at future events. Indeed, Bell suggests that the struggle for
advancing racial equality is contingent on understanding and
applying interest-convergence to future issues.51 Bell writes
regarding the fate of Brown:
The change in racial circumstances since 1954 rivals or surpasses all
that occurred during the period that preceded it. If the decision that
was at least a catalyst for that change is to remain viable, those who
rely on it must exhibit the dynamic awareness of all the legal and
political considerations that influenced those who wrote it.52
Therefore, according to Bell, understanding of the past can guide
both the present and the future. This is particularly relevant
with the election of a president who has stoked the flames of
racial animosity.53
B. The Public Use Doctrine
Eminent domain can be traced to Roman law54 and has
been codified in the Constitution.55 While the Takings Clause,
51 Bell, supra note 29 at 528 (“Further progress to fulfill the mandate of Brown is
possible to the extent that the divergence of racial interests can be avoided or minimized.”).
52 Id. at 533. Bell would later express deep pessimism that transformational
societal change was possible. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:
THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM, at ix (1992) (“[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and
indestructible component of this society.”).
53 See infra Section III.B.
54 Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR.
L. REV. 203, 204 (1978) (tracing the origins of eminent domain).
55 U.S. CONST., amend. V. One theory of eminent domain is that it is an
inherent characteristic of sovereignty. See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518
(1883) (“The power to take private property for public uses, generally termed the right
of eminent domain, belongs to every independent government. It is an incident of
sovereignty, and . . . requires no constitutional recognition.” (citation omitted)); Boom
Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1879) (“The right of eminent domain, that is, the right
to take private property for public uses, appertains to every independent government. It
requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty.”). Another theory
of federal eminent domain power when exercised by the legislative branch is that it
resides in the Necessary and Proper Clause. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry.
Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896) (Upholding a historic preservation law under the Necessary
and Proper Clause because it “comes within the rule laid down by Chief Justice Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 421, in these words: ‘Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adequate to that end, which are not prohibited but consist with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.’”). A related theory of federal eminent
domain power holds that when it is exercised by the executive branch, it is constrained
by the separation of powers. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
587–88 (1952) (“In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The
Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws
he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The
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which applies to the federal government, provides, “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation,”56 courts have struggled to define the limits of
“public use” over time.57
In early cases, the Supreme Court fluctuated in defining
the concept of “public use” in both narrow and broad ways—
“narrow” meaning either use (or right to use) by the government
or the public, and “broad” meaning public benefit or advantage.58
Until 1954, the Supreme Court continued to vacillate as to how
restrictively the concept of “public use” would be interpreted.59
As will be discussed, the three modern Supreme Court
cases that would define the contours of contemporary public use
doctrine are Berman v. Parker,60 Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff,61 and Kelo v. City of New London.62 All three embraced
a broad interpretation of what constitutes public use—and all
three cases give government great deference in making public
use determinations. This extreme deference to government
decision making is problematic when racial animus permeates
throughout the process.
first section of the first article says that ‘All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .’”).
56 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
57 This article focuses on “public use” in the Takings Clause as applied to
physical takings of real property and will not address the questions of what types of
government regulations constitute takings or what is “just compensation” for eminent
domain purposes. Furthermore, this article centers its analysis on eminent domain
under the U.S. Constitution and not under the various states’ constitutions, except for
comparison purposes later in the article.
58 See Berger, supra note 54, at 208–09.
59 Compare Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (holding
that the State ordering a railway company to grant another private entity the right to
build and operate an elevator on the railway company’s property in order to expand grain
storage capacity was not a public use because it was a “taking by a State of the private
property of one person . . . for the private use of another”) and City of Cincinnati v.
Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 447–48 (1930) (holding that the city’s taking of more property than
that was needed to widen a major street was inconsistent with public use and “the
municipality is called upon to specify definitely the purpose of the appropriation”) and
Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 79 (1937) (holding that the Texas
Railroad Commission’s order to limit the total production of gas in order to prevent waste
but which forced the plaintiff gas company to purchase additional gas from other
companies was not a public use because it was a “glaring instance of the taking of one
man’s property and giving it to another.”),with Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164
U.S. 112, 161–62 (1896) (holding that a state law that allowed for the creation of
irrigation districts that facilitated the supply of water across the land was a public use
even though the entire community did not have the subsequent right to use the water)
and Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles Cty., 262 U.S. 700, 706–07 (1923) (holding that the
county’s taking of a private landowner’s ranch to construct public roads was a public use
even though the roads connect with no other public roads at certain ends).
60 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
61 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
62 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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C. Racial Animus, Government Decision-Making, and
Property Law
Racial animus refers to prejudice or hostility against
racial groups. A case that illustrates the danger of extreme
deference to government decision making in the context of racial
animus is Korematsu v. United States.63 In Korematsu, Fred
Korematsu, a Japanese American, challenged his criminal
conviction for violating an exclusion order that prohibited people
of Japanese ancestry from being in certain areas.64 Specifically,
Korematsu was convicted for being in San Leandro, CA, which
was designated a “Military Area.”65 Justice Black, writing for the
majority established that racial classifications should be
“subject . . . to the most rigid scrutiny.”66 Despite this, the Court
upheld the exclusion order noting the great deference given to
government decision-makers in times of war.67
Forty years after the Supreme Court’s decision, Fred
Korematsu brought a writ of corum nobis in a federal district
court in California seeking to overturn his criminal conviction.68
The district court considered two new sources of information in
finding that Korematsu’s criminal conviction suffered from
errors of fact. One was that military necessity did not justify the
internment of Japanese Americans; instead, the internment was
caused by “race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political
63 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
64 Id. at 215–16.
65 Id. at 215.
66 Id. at 216.
67 Id. at 223–24 (“Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because
of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese
Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our
West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided
that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese
ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress,
reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it
must—determined that they should have the power to do just this. . . . We cannot—by
availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these
actions were unjustified.”). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy characterized the
majority’s opinion as a “legalization of racism.” Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Murphy wrote:
This exclusion of “all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien,”
from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence of
martial law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over “the very brink
of constitutional power” and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.
Id. at 233.
68 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1984). “A
writ of coram nobis is an appropriate remedy by which the court can correct errors in
criminal convictions where other remedies are not available.” Id. at 1411.
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leadership.”69 Another reason was consideration of documents
that were “knowingly concealed from the courts” while the
Supreme Court case was pending that showed contradictory
evidence as to the military necessity of the internment.70 In
taking this new information into account and overturning
Korematsu’s conviction, Judge Patel recognized the need for
heightened scrutiny in the context of racial animus in order to
protect the rights of citizens targeted based on fear and
prejudice.71 Similarly, if Trump’s border wall proposal is
motivated by a fear of dark-skinned people coming to America,72
then the government’s taking of private property should be
analyzed with heightened scrutiny.
Another example of the dangers of giving too much
deference to government decision-making comes from an
eminent domain case before the Missouri Court of Appeals in
1959.73 In City of Creve Coeur v. Weinstein, an African American
couple, Howard and Katie Venable, obtained a building permit
to start construction on a new house in the city of Creve Coeur,
a suburb of St. Louis.74 After the white residents of Creve Coeur
learned that African Americans were trying to settle in the area,
they formed a “Citizens Committee” and tried to purchase the
property from the Venables in order to prevent them from
residing in the all-white community.75 When the couple refused
to sell, the Citizens Committee convinced the city to take action
against the Venables.76 First, the city denied the couple a
plumbing permit to thwart progress on the construction of their
new home.77 Next, the city condemned the property through its
eminent domain power by claiming it was taking the property
for use as a public park.78 The Venables argued that they “ha[d]
been denied the right to choose, free from racial discrimination,
69 Id. at 1416–17 (citation omitted).
70 Id. at 1417–19. For a fascinating account of how a scholar, while doing
research for a book, later uncovered the intentionally concealed documents through a
Freedom of Information Act request, see PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED
OUR CONSTITUTION 362 (2006).
71 Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
72 This article argues that it is. See infra Section III.B.
73 Missouri ex rel. City of Creve Coeur v. Weinstein, 329 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959).
74 Id. at 402.
75 Id. at 403.
76 Id. at 402.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 402–03.
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the City of Creve Coeur in which to make their home.”79 The
Missouri Court of Appeals held for the city, noting:
[O]nce it is established that the use for which private property is
appropriated is public, the judicial authority of the court is exhausted.
This means that the courts have no authority to pass upon the motives
of a legislative body in enacting a statute or an ordinance and are
powerless to consider the question of what reasons actuated the
legislative body in the passing of the statute or the ordinance, as the
case may be.80
Thus, under this lax standard of judicial review, the fact that
racial animus infected the government’s decision making was
irrelevant. So long as the government articulated a legitimate
public use—in this case, the construction of a park that was open
to the public—the condemnation would be upheld. In short, the
Venables’ exclusion from the neighborhood based on their race
was not even considered in determining the benefits that the
“public” would enjoy by the taking. Analogously, if Trump’s
border wall proposal is infected with racial animus, then it
should be held to heightened judicial scrutiny to avoid a similar
outcome to this earlier case.
D. Applying Interest-Convergence Theory to Property
Theory
1. Property Law Examples of Micro-Level Interest-
Convergence
Interest-convergence is not commonly applied to property
law issues. This thesis, however, can be seen in earlier property
cases on a micro-level. In certain property disputes, the interests
of certain individual sellers and buyers of homes were aligned.
For example, in Buchanan v. Warley, a white plaintiff was
challenging a racial zoning law in Louisville, Kentucky that
prohibited him from selling his home to an African American
buyer.81 Although at odds with many of his white neighbors and
the local government, the interest of the white seller was in
selling his house to whomever he chose. Similarly, the interest
of the African American buyer was in becoming a homeowner
79 Id. at 402. They further claimed that the City “[h]astily chose a site for
alleged park condemnation purposes and disregarded unsuitable topography, location,
and cost of the area sought to be condemned” Id. at 403 (internal quotations omitted).
80 Id. at 406.
81 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 72–73 (1917). The zoning ordinance
provided that it was unlawful for a “colored person” to move into a block that was
occupied by a majority of white people and it was also unlawful for a white person to
move into a block that was occupied by a majority of “colored people.” Id. at 70–71.
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and subsequently being able to sell to whomever he chose. The
Court described the alignment of interests by observing, “The
right which the [zoning] ordinance annulled was the civil right
of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to
a person of color and of a colored person to make such disposition
to a white person.”82 In finding a violation of this right of
disposition in the context of converging interests between a
buyer and seller of different racial backgrounds, the Court
struck down the racial zoning ordinance on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds.83
Furthermore, in Shelley v. Kraemer, the Shelleys were
African American buyers of a home in St. Louis, Missouri who
were challenging the racially restrictive covenants that were
contained in the deed.84 White neighbors were trying to invalidate
the sale by enforcing the covenants against the Shelleys.85 The
Shelleys’ interest in this dispute was in becoming homeowners. In
line with this interest, but at odds with her white neighbors who
were trying to nullify the sale, the white seller of the home had
an interest in being allowed to sell to whomever she chose.86 The
Court framed the rights at issue broadly enough to encompass the
interests of both the buyer and seller:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be
protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of
property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded
by the framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the
realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the
Amendment was intended to guarantee.87
82 Id. at 81.
83 Id. at 82 (“We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in
question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, and is
in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of law.”).
84 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1948). The covenant provided that:
[N]o part of said property or any portion thereof shall be, for said term of Fifty-
years, occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended
hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of time against the
occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or
other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.
Id. at 4–5.
85 Id. at 6.
86 The case notes that the person on the warranty deed was listed as Josephine
Fitzgerald. Id. at 5 n.1.
87 Id. at 10.
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In this moment of micro-level interest-convergence between the
African American buyers and the white seller of the home,88 the
Court ultimately found for the Shelleys and struck down state
court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants as a violation
of equal protection.89
A final example of micro-level interest-convergence in the
property realm is in the race nuisance cases during the Jim Crow
era. These cases involved white landowners attempting to use
nuisance law to challenge the presence of African Americans in
white neighborhoods.90 Legal scholar Rachel Godsil analyzed
such situations and found that in a slight majority (“thirteen of
twenty-three”) of the cases she could find, “appellate courts
rejected claims [by white landowners] that . . . land uses by
[African Americans] constituted nuisances.”91 The interests of
the individual white judges in these thirteen cases could have
ranged from preserving property rights in general,92 to applying
a formalistic application of nuisance law,93 while the interest of
the African Americans in these cases were simply in the use and
enjoyment of their land. Based on these overlapping individual
interests, a micro-level convergence occurred between these
races and ultimately led to the civil rights of racial minorities
being protected.
2. Kelo v. City of New London and Macro-Level
Interest-Convergence
Interest-convergence can also be a tool of understanding the
current historical moment in eminent domain law. This would be
more of a macro-level convergence in which broad group interests
have come together. In other words, unlike the micro-level
convergence examples, macro-level convergence is profuse and
monumental. It is neither localized to particular individuals nor at
oddswithmany in theminority andmajority groups inwhich these
88 See RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 134 (Harvard Univ. Press,
2013) (noting in the context of racially restrictive covenants, there existed “a kind of wary
cooperation between restricted white sellers or landlords and the minority renters or
buyers who wanted to move into their forbidden properties. . . . [F]or at least a few fleeting
moments, the interests of these groups were aligned—aligned against covenants.”).
89 Id. at 20.
90 See Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow
Era, 105 MICH. L. REV. 505, 514 (2006).
91 Id. at 520. Godsil found that no appellate court between 1877 and 1954 held
the mere presence (as opposed to claims based on conduct) of African Americans or
Mexicans to be a nuisance. Id. at 519.
92 See id. at 546–49.
93 Id. at 533–36.
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people belong. Just as the interests of the minority and majority
converged at a macro-level in Brown v. Board of Education, they
have converged in the same way in reforming eminent domain
doctrine in the aftermath of Kelo v. City of New London.94
After experiencing decades of economic decline, New
London adopted “a development plan that . . . was ‘projected to
create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues,
and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its
downtown and waterfront areas.’”95 The city authorized the New
London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit
entity, to submit and implement a development plan.96 During
the planning stage, “the pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc.
announced that it would build a $300 million research facility”
nearby.97 In acquiring land for the project, the city authorized
NLDC to purchase property from willing sellers and use the
power of eminent domain to acquire the remaining property
from unwilling owners in exchange for just compensation.98
Kelo involved owners of condemned property who
challenged the city’s exercise of eminent domain power.99 The
plaintiffs were landowners in the Fort Trumbull area of New
London, Connecticut, who refused to sell their land to the city.100
They claimed, among other things, that the city’s exercise of
eminent domain was in violation of the Public Use Clause.101
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice
Stevens, held for the city and ruled that the taking was
constitutional. The Court majority noted that “our public use
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive
scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power.”102 The majority rejected the landowners’ argument to
scrutinize the means that the government chose by asking if a
“reasonable certainty” that the expected public benefits would
be achieved.103 This exclusive focus on the rationality of the
government ends or goals—with no inquiry into the means
chosen to achieve the ends—was a form of extreme deference for
government decision making. In 2009, just four years after Kelo
94 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
95 Id. at 472 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004)).
96 Id. at 473.
97 Id. at 473.




102 Id. at 483.
103 Id. at 487–88.
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was decided, Pfizer announced that it was leaving the area,
taking 1,400 jobs with it.104 Ten years after Kelo, the condemned
lands remained vacant.105
Themany peoplewho opposeKelohave come fromboth sides
of the political spectrum.106 “In two national surveys conducted
in . . . 2005, 81 percent and 95 percent of respondents were opposed
to Kelo”—both results showing unified opposition across racial,
104 See Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/nyregion/13pfizer.html
[https://perma.cc/4KAS-GEXG] (“Pfizer said it would pull 1,400 jobs out of New London
within two years and move most of them a few miles away to a campus it owns near
Groton, Conn., as a cost-cutting measure. It would leave behind the city’s biggest office
complex and an adjacent swath of barren land that was cleared of dozens of homes to
make room for a hotel, stores and condominiums that were never built.”).
105 See Fort Trumbull Neighborhood Remains Vacant a Decade After City Took
Land, DAY (June 22, 2015, 8:42 AM), http://www.theday.com/article/20150619/
NWS01/150629979 [https://perma.cc/NDR4-UBS6]. A new economic development project
was proposed in 2015; however, the new plan did not need any of the land that was taken
by eminent domain ten years earlier. See Ilya Somin, New Economic Development May
Be Coming to the Neighborhood Where Kelo v. City of New London Occurred—But Not




B74Q-ALD6] (noting that the Naval Undersea Warfare Center was owned by the city
“long before the [Kelo] takings” and that “the condemned properties [in Kelo] were on
Parcel 3 and Parcel 4A”—two parcels that would not be touched by the 2015 proposal);
Collin A. Young, New Residential Proposal for Fort Trumbull in New London, DAY (Mar.
21, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://www.theday.com/local/20150320/new-residential-proposal-
for-fort-trumbull-in-new-london [https://perma.cc/2YGQ-JRCJ] (noting that “[t]he
development would be situated . . . . on roughly [four] acres of land split among parcels
2A, 2B, and 2C and would have water views overlooking Coast Guard Station New
London and Fort Trumbull State Park. The entire project is on land that was once the
Naval Undersea Warfare Center site”).
106 See ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND
THELIMITS OFEMINENTDOMAIN 138 (2015). Joseph Singer explains this alignment from
a distribution of ownership burdens perspective:
Liberals worry a great deal about . . . the unequal distribution of the burdens
of ownership, as when polluting factories are located in areas dominated by
poor people or disempowered racial groups. The liberal worry about the
distribution of the burdens of property explains why many liberals sided with
the Kelos to oppose the taking of their house for transfer to a big corporation.
They saw themselves as seeking to limit the power of government to oppress
the weak in favor of the powerful, to protect small owners from big owners. Of
course, this worry about disparate impacts is also a conservative stance when
it comes to regulatory takings. The conservative argument for compensation is
that it is unfair for the burdens of public programs to be visited on those few
property owners whose property is seized for the public good. This means that
there is a crucially important convergence between liberals and conservatives.
Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles,
Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 331 (2006).
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gender, and political lines.107 Similar results were demonstrated in a
2009 public opinion poll.108
These aligned interests, especially across race, suggest a
moment of possibility for collective resistance to extreme judicial
deference to government decision making regarding eminent
domain. Thus, we are in a unique historical moment in which the
interests of both minority and majority racial groups have
converged to push for heightened scrutiny in legal challenges to
federal government exercises of eminent domain. Specifically, both
minority and majority interests have come together to oppose
Trump’s plan to take private property for his proposed border wall.
An exploration of the racial contexts of the major modern Supreme
Court decisions on eminent domain demonstrate that racial
minorities have an interest in increasing and maintaining their
homeownership from a civil rights perspective, while white people
have an interest in limiting the power of government to take their
homes from a property rights perspective.
II. AN INTEREST-CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF THE BROAD,
DEFERENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF “PUBLICUSE” IN
EMINENTDOMAIN
The interest of people of color is the same now as when
Professor Derrick Bell wrote his interest-convergence article in
1980.109 That interest was and remains the achievement of racial
equality in America.110 An expression of this interest is in the
civil rights strategy of increasing homeownership among people
of color in an attempt to reduce the racial wealth gap.111 This is
107 See SOMIN, supra note 106, at 138–39. (analyzing survey data from Zogby
International, American Farm Bureau Federation Survey 27 and Saint Index 2005).
108 Id. at 138–39 (“The 2009 survey [based on Stephen Ansolabahere and
Nathaniel Persily, Field Report: Constitutional Attitudes Survey 61 (Knowledge
Networks, July 2010)] results closely mimic those of the 2005 polls and show that public
hostility to economic development takings was not simply the result of an immediate
emotional reaction to the Kelo decision. As in the 2005 Saint Index poll, the 2009 survey
shows over 80 percent opposition to economic development takings; once again, the
overwhelming opposition cuts across racial, gender, ideological, and partisan lines.”).
109 See Bell, supra note 29, at 523.
110 See id. (identifying a black interest “in achieving racial equality.”).
111 See Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56
HOW. L.J. 849, 883 (2013) (“Given that equity in a primary residence represents the largest
asset most Americans of any race or ethnicity possess in their asset portfolios, lawyers should
undertake efforts to increase homeownership within the African American and Latino
communities, particularly given the current substantial racial homeownership gaps between
these groups and white Americans.”); Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative
Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 127–44 (2013) (arguing that
progressive property theorists should focus more on issues of race-related acquisition and
distribution, both historically and prospectively); ThomasM. Shapiro,Race, Homeownership,
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not a new strategy.112 Renowned American abolitionist Frederick
Douglass noted in 1849 that “we hold civil government to be
solemnly bound to protect the weak against the strong, the
oppressed against the oppressor, the few against the many, and
to secure the humblest subject in the full possession of his rights
of person and of property.”113 This struggle continues today.114 As
such, it is in racial minorities’ interest to oppose rules that make
it too easy for government actors to take their houses through
eminent domain.115 Here, an interest-convergence analysis is
applicable because both racial minorities and the white majority
have interests in stopping President Trump from obtaining
private property to construct the proposed border wall.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Kelo majority,116 relied
primarily on two Supreme Court cases to support its holding:
Berman v. Parker117 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.118
Although these cases were framed by the Court in race-neutral
ways, an interest-convergence analysis shows otherwise.
Specifically, it demonstrates the racial interests embedded in
and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J. L. &POL’Y 53, 65–74 (2006) (arguing that homeownership is the
main policy strategy for closing the racial wealth gap).
112 African American litigants have been suing for equal homeownership
opportunities for decades, some even winning their cases before the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441–43 (1968) (holding that a real estate
company’s refusal to sell to an African American home buyer because of his race was a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because such racial barriers to owning property constituted
“badges and incidents of slavery.”); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21, 23 (1948)
(holding that court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants contained in private
land deeds was a violation of equal protection).
113 Frederick Douglass, Comments on Gerrit Smith’s Address, NORTH STAR
(Mar. 30, 1849), https://rbscp.lib.rochester.edu/4383 [https://perma.cc/4NV8-DUQW].
114 For statistics on the racial homeownership gap in America, see JOINTCTR. FOR
HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2017),
http://www.JCHS.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/harvard_jchs_state_of_the_natio
ns_housing_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WX5-7XWL]. The home ownership rate in the first
quarter of 2017 was 71.9% for whites, 42.2% for blacks, 55.5% for Asians, and 46% for
Hispanics. Id. at 4.
115 There is nothing inherently immoral or oppressive about eminent domain.
Indeed, there may be certain situations where this power could be used to benefit
oppressed peoples. For example, the government can take the land of a private
corporation for the public use of creating low-income housing that is racially integrated,
affordable, and near or easily accessible to good-paying jobs. Since eminent domain has
been employed in so many oppressive ways, however, this article contends that
heightened scrutiny should be used by the courts to limit the government’s power. In
suggesting a new way forward, even in the example of eminent domain power protecting
the civil rights of racial minorities, the government should be held to its burden of proof
that the means are connected to the ends when legal challenges arise. If the government
can meet its burden, then it is more likely that the government’s stated policy goals will
be actualized. Further, the corporation in the hypothetical above would argue for
heightened scrutiny. The specific level of proof in this situation required by the
government is beyond the scope of this article.
116 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480–82 (2005).
117 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
118 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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these cases and why racial minorities should oppose extreme
judicial deference to government takings decisions.
A. Berman v. Parker
1. Background
In Berman v. Parker, private landowners sought to enjoin
government condemnation of their property pursuant to the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 (D.C. Act).119
Under the D.C. Act, “Congress made a ‘legislative determination’”
that substandard housing and blighted areas120 were “injurious to
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare” in the District and
it was within the government’s authority to eliminate all such
conditions.121 To accomplish this, the D.C. Act created the
National Capital Planning Commission, which authorized the
development of “a comprehensive or general [land use] plan”;122
additionally, the Act also created the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Land Agency, authorizing the use of eminent
domain to acquire and assemble property to implement the
119 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
120 The Act did not define “blighted areas,” leaving it up to the authorized
government actors’ judgment to determine whether blight was present. Section 3(r) of
the Act, however, provided some guidance:
‘Substandard housing conditions’ means the conditions obtaining in connection
with the existence of any dwelling, or dwellings, or housing accommodations
for human beings, which because of lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or
light, or because of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or
any combination of these factors, is in the opinion of the Commissioners
detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of the
District of Columbia.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 n.1 (quoting District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch.
736, § 3(r), 60 Stat. 790, 792). These elements are so broad, however, they can be made
to apply to almost any residential area. For example, all buildings will experience some
dilapidation, to some extent, over time. Wendell E. Pritchett contends:
Blight was a facially neutral term infused with racial and ethnic prejudice.
While it purportedly assessed the state of urban infrastructure, blight was
often used to describe the negative impact of certain residents on city
neighborhoods. This “scientific” method of understanding urban decline was
used to justify the removal of blacks and other minorities from certain parts of
the city. By selecting racially changing neighborhoods as blighted areas and
designating them for redevelopment, the urban renewal program enabled
institutional and political elites to relocate minority populations and entrench
racial segregation.
Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2003).
121 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
122 Id. at 29.
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comprehensive plan.123 To redevelop an area in Southwest D.C.,
the agency sought to seize the land of private landowners through
the power of eminent domain.124
The landowners argued, among other things, that the
taking of their property was impermissible because it was not
for a public use—it was simply taking their non-blighted
commercial property and transferring it to another business.125
The Court disagreed with the landowners and held for the
government, noting that “when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive.”126 The Court further observed that “[t]he role of the
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised
for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”127
Berman adopted a very broad view of public use, which
allows the government to take private property and transfer it to
another private entity. In allowing for great deference to
legislative decision making, the Court stated that public use can
encompass values that “are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary.”128 In sum, “public use” was defined so
broadly and the government was given so much deference that
the notion of “public use” could be almost anything the
government declared it to be.
2. Race and Berman v. Parker
An analysis of Berman v. Parker through an interest-
convergence lens indicates why African Americans and other
people of color have an interest in limiting the government’s
takings power. Perhaps because the case was brought by white
business owners in the area and not the predominantly African
American residents of Southwest D.C.,129 Berman had a racial
dimension that was only mentioned in passing by the Court.
Specifically, the Court acknowledged that the population of Area
123 Id. The D.C. Act further declared such acquisition and assembly of real
property as a public use. Id.
124 According to the D.C. Act, “[p]reference is to be given to private enterprise
over public agencies in executing the redevelopment plan.” Id. at 30 (quoting District of
Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, § 7(g), 60 Stat. 796).
125 The plaintiffs in Berman were owners of a department store located in Area
B who argued that the government should not be allowed to take their property because
their building was not suffering from blight—even though the surrounding area may
have been. Id. at 31.
126 Id. at 32.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
129 Wendell Pritchett notes that “none of the briefs in the Berman case even
mentioned the fact that the project would uproot thousands of poor blacks and would
reshape Washington’s racial landscape.” Pritchett, supra note 120, at 44.
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B was 5,012 people, of whom 97.5% were African American.130
Thus, the overwhelming majority of the 5,012 people who lost
their homes were members of a historically oppressed group.
Although race was barely mentioned by the Court, there
was nothing race-neutral about the context of Berman. This case
entailed a group of white decision makers negatively
determining the fates of African American residents. It is
important to note that the African Americans who were
displaced by the urban renewal approved of in Berman did not
move back to the area.131 Thus, the residents of Southwest D.C.
were permanently displaced in the name of “public use.”
Indeed, the year Berman was decided—1954—was the
same year that the Supreme Court struck down, for the first time,
state-sponsored racial segregation as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.132 Before 1954, Jim Crow laws133—i.e., state and
local laws that segregated people based on race according to white
supremacist ideology—had been upheld by the Supreme Court for
almost sixty years.134 During the Jim Crow era, various public
facilities were racially separated by law, but certainly not equal.135
130 Berman, 348 U.S. at 30.
131 HOWARDGILLETTE, JR., BETWEEN JUSTICE ANDBEAUTY: RACE, PLANNING, AND
THE FAILURE OFURBAN POLICY INWASHINGTON, D.C. 164 (1995) (“More than a third of the
population displaced found alternative homes in public housing, much of it just outside the
redevelopment area. Another 2,000 families moved into private rental units, and only 391
purchased private homes, all in other parts of the city.”). Many of the displaced African
Americans that were victims of urban renewal in D.C. settled in neighborhoods located in
Southeast D.C. See KILOLOKIJAKAZI, DARRICKHAMILTON, RACHELMARIE BROOKS ATKINS,
WILLIAM A. DARITY JR., MARK PAUL & ANNE E. PRICE, THE COLOR OF WEALTH IN THE
NATION’S CAPITAL: A JOINT PUBLICATION OF THEURBAN INSTITUTE, DUKEUNIVERSITY, THE
NEW SCHOOL, AND THE INSIGHT CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 13, 25
(2016), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/85341/2000986-2-the-color-of-
wealth-in-the-nations-capital.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RMD-CCYR].
132 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).
133 Jim Crow took its name from a minstrel character. See W.T. Lhamon, Jr.,
Turning Around Jim Crow, in BURNT CORK: TRADITIONS AND LEGACIES OF BLACKFACE
MINSTRELSY 18, 28 (Stephen Johnson ed., 2012) (discussing how by 1842, Jim Crow—a
popular minstrel character—“had become an adjective for racial segregation”).
134 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540, 552 (1896) (upholding “Separate
but Equal” laws in New Orleans); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85–87 (1927) (holding
that racial segregation of a Chinese American student to a “school for colored children”
was constitutional under Plessy).
135 See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950) (“These
restrictions . . . . signify that the State, in administering the facilities it affords for
professional and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart from the other students. The
result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction.
Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.”); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633–34 (1950) (“Whether the University of Texas Law School is
compared with the original or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial
equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the
State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for
specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review
and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior. What is more
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Brown, the seminal case, served as a death knell for Jim Crow.136
This meant that Berman was decided in the same year that the
Court removed its imprimatur from white supremacist laws that
segregated people based on race and denied people of color equal
resources in their separate spaces.
Racial segregation was certainly present in the District’s
housing at the time of Berman. In a 1948 report issued by a D.C.-
based civil rights group known as the “National Committee on
Segregation in the Nation’s Capital,” the group noted, “As a
result of their segregation in slum areas, the housing available
to [African Americans] is necessarily inferior to that of people
who are free to live anywhere in the city.”137 The report further
observed that the urban renewal of the 1940s was forcing
African American people to move to make room for middle-class
housing restricted to whites.138 In sum, housing segregation in
D.C. and the subsequent displacement of African Americans
from their communities greatly diminished the opportunities for
fair housing for members of this racial minority group.
The urban renewal that was approved by the Court in
Berman was common across the country. Professor Ilya Somin
writes, “By 1963, over 600,000 people had lost their homes as a
result of urban renewal takings. The vast majority ended up living
in worse conditions than they had experienced before their homes
were condemned, and many suffered serious nonpecuniary losses
as well.”139 Additionally, from 1949 to 1973, about two-thirds of the
important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in
a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the
community, traditions and prestige.”).
136 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.”).
137 NAT’L COMM. ON SEGREGATION IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL, SEGREGATION IN
WASHINGTON, A REPORT 26 (1948); see also Wendell E. Pritchett, A National Issue:
Segregation in the District of Columbia and the Civil Rights Movement at Mid-Century, 93
GEO.L.J. 1321, 1325–26, (describing the committee’s origins andpurpose. Pritchett notes that
as part of the committee’s work, “a group of more than a dozen researchers . . . examined
several areas of race relations in the District. Among the topics they studied were: the
housing, job, and health status of D.C.’s black population; segregation and discrimination
within the federal government; the district government and the debates over ‘home rule,’ and
the influence of business and real estate interests in the city.”).
138 NAT’L COMM. ON SEGREGATION IN THENATION’S CAPITAL, supra note 137, at
41 (noting that of the 30,700 new units built during the 1940s, only 200, or less than 1%,
were available to African Americans).
139 SOMIN, supra note 106, at 87 (footnotes omitted). Jane Jacobs discussed
some of the nonpecuniary losses that arise from urban development: “Whole
communities are torn apart and sown to the winds, with a reaping of cynicism,
resentment and despair that must be heard and seen to be believed.” JANE JACOBS,
DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 5 (1961). Frank Michelman also discussed
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people displaced by urban renewal were nonwhite.140 Historian
Richard Rothstein in his book Color of Law explains how the cycle
of racial segregation, starting with government slum clearance and
continuing with African American’s dispersal to other segregated
areas, became self-perpetuating.141 The lax judicial scrutiny under
Berman that allowed for such easy clearance facilitated this vicious
cycle. Today, African Americans have an interest in strengthening
judicial oversight over government takings in order to ensure fairer
outcomes than what has happened in the past.
B. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
1. Background
Thirty years after Berman, the Supreme Court was faced
with another case involving the scope of public use.142 This was the
second major case relied on by the Kelo majority.143 Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff involved trustees of landholding
estates seeking relief declaring the Hawaii Land Reform Act of
nonpecuniary losses related to just compensation in his concept of “demoralization costs.”
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967)
(“‘Demoralization costs’ are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset
dis-utilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the
realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value
of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused
by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers
disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on
some other occasion.”).
140 SOMIN, supra note 106, at 88 (footnotes omitted).
141 RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 127 (2017). Rothstein further argues that
government, at all levels, was “actively and aggressively” complicit in housing
segregation in the following ways: (1) U.S. government’s decision to build racially
separate public housing; (2) federal government’s urging of suburbs to adopt
exclusionary zoning laws; (3) Federal Housing Administration’s redlining policies; (4)
state courts’ enforcement of racially restrictive covenants even after Shelley v. Kraemer
in 1948; (5) U.S. government’s grant of tax exempt status to racially discriminatory
churches, universities, and hospitals; (6) police inaction and even encouragement of
white mobs who threatened, intimidated, and attacked African Americans who moved to
white neighborhoods; (7) state real estate commissions licensing of brokers who engaged
in racially discriminatory practices; (8) local school boards’ placement of schools and
drawing of attendance boundaries that ensured racial separation; (9) federal and state
highway planners’ decision to build roads that made it easier for white suburbanites to
commute to urban centers, while demolishing urban ghettos in the process; (10) U.S.
government’s failure to protect African Americans’ labor market rights; (11) federal
government’s decision to give tax breaks in racially coded ways—e.g., mortgage
deduction for home owners, while no deduction for renters; (12) federal and state
government’s failure to invest in adequate public transportation networks; and (13)
federal government’s decision to direct low-income African Americans who receive
housing assistance into racially segregated neighborhoods. Id. at 216–17.
142 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
143 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 481–82 (2005).
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1967 (Hawaii Act) unconstitutional.144 The Court explained that in
the mid-1960s, the Hawaii legislature found that “while the State
and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State’s land,
another 47% was in the hands of only [seventy-two] private
landowners.”145Throughout the state, most of the people living on
privately owned lands were leasing from the landowners. “The
legislature concluded that [this] concentrat[ion of] land ownership”
in the hands of a few “was responsible for skewing the State’s
residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring
the public tranquility and welfare.”146
In response to the land oligopoly that was purportedly
causing these issues, the legislature enacted theHawaii Act, which
established the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) and “created a
mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for transferring
ownership of the condemned fees simple to existing lessees.”147
Under the Hawaii Act, tenants living on certain residential lots
were entitled to submit applications to the Hawaii Housing
Authority (HHA) “to condemn the property on which they live[d]”
that was located “within developmental tracts at least five acres in
size.”148 If a specified number of tenants in any tract filed such
applications, the HHA was authorized “to hold . . . public
hearing[s] to determine whether acquisition by the State of all or
part of the tract [would] ‘effectuate the public purposes’ of the
Act.”149 If the HHA found that the public purposes would be served,
the Authority could “designate some or all of the lots in [a
landowner’s] tract for acquisition.”150 If the landowners of the
designated tracts refused to voluntarily sell their land to HHA, the
agency could take the property and pay just compensation.151 The
trustees of the landowning estates challenged this law as a
violation of the public use provision in the Takings Clause.152
The Court upheld the Hawaii Act as constitutional, noting
that judicial review of the legislature’s judgment of what
144 Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S., at 233–35.
145 Id. at 232. Further, “[eighteen] landowners, with tracts of 21,000 acres or
more, owned more than 40% of this land and that on Oahu, the most urbanized of the
islands, [Twenty-two] landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles.” Id.
146 Id. But see Sumner J. La Croix & Louis A. Rose, Public Use, Just Compensation
and Land Reform in Hawaii, 17 RES. L. & ECON. 47, 69 (1995) (arguing “that the
concentration of land ownership was not responsible for high land prices in
Hawaii. . . . rather, . . . the high prices were attributable largely to natural and governmental
restrictions [such as zoning and permitting practices] on the supply of land for housing use.”).
147 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233.
148 Id.
149 Id. (quoting Haw. Rev. Stat. § 516-22 (1977).
150 Id. at 233–34.
151 See id. at 234. HHA was then allowed to sell the land to the tenants, who
would become fee simple owners instead of lessees. Id.
152 Id. at 234–35.
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constitutes a public use is “extremely narrow.”153 The Court
articulated a constitutional test that amounts to the lowest level of
judicial scrutiny—rational basis review.154 The test involves two
elements: (1) the legislature’s exercise of eminent domain power
must have a legitimate purpose; and (2) a rational relationship
must exist between the law enacted and this legitimate purpose.155
Thus, under this test, great deference was afforded to the
legislature’s judgment.156
Here, utilizing rational basis review, the Court first found
that the state had a legitimate purpose157 in diluting the land
market noting, “Regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with
it is a classic exercise of a State’s police powers.”158As for the second
prong of rational basis review, the Court held that there was a
rational relationship between the Hawaii Act and the legitimate
purpose of fostering dilution of the land market.159 The Court
observed that the lawwas “a comprehensive and rational approach
to identifying and correcting market failure.”160 The Court further
defined the scope of its review narrowly by stating:
Of course, this Act, like any other, may not be successful in achieving its
intended goals. But “whether in fact the provision will accomplish its
objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied
if . . . the . . . [state] Legislature rationally could have believed that the
[Act] would promote its objective.”161
Thus, the scope of the Court’s reviewwas severely limited—
no independent judicial inquiry would be made as to whether the
means chosen were likely to advance the government’s ends. The
only inquiry was whether the legislature could have rationally
153 Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
154 Id. at 242.
155 Id. at 242–43.
156 The Court observed, “Judicial deference is required because, in our system of
government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced
by an exercise of the taking power. State legislatures are as capable as Congress of making
such determinations within their respective spheres of authority.” Id. at 244.
157 The Court also refers to a legitimate purpose as a “conceivable public
purpose.” Id. at 241 (“But where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking
to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”).
158 Id. at 242 (citations omitted). Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous
Court, stated, “The ‘public use’ requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign’s police powers.” Id. at 240. Later, Justice O’Connor retreated from her
statement in Midkiff, by stating in her dissenting opinion in Kelo, “The case before us
now demonstrates why, when deciding if a taking’s purpose is constitutional, the police
power and ‘public use’ cannot always be equated.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 501–02 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
159 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242.
160 Id.
161 Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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believed that the means would work. Under this lax standard, the
Hawaii Act was found to be a permissible taking.
2. Race and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
LikeBerman,Midkiff also had a racial dimension that was
not acknowledged by the Court. An interest-convergence analysis
demonstrates that the history of how Hawaii became a state is
one rife with racism and Western imperialism. Further, it shows
howMidkiff was a decision that was consistent with this history.
Prior to annexation and statehood, Hawaii was a
constitutional monarchy until 1893, when its last ruler, Queen
Liliuokalani, was overthrownwith the aid of the U.S.military and
the land was annexed as a U.S territory.162 With this annexation,
white Americans eventually took control of Hawaii by
establishing both economic and political dominance.163 In writing
about the white Americans who conspired to overthrow the
kingdom, Queen Liliuokalani observed that they justified their
actions by the belief that the indigenous people were not capable
of self-governance.164 Similarly, if President Trump is allowed to
take tribal lands to build his border wall, a similar rationale of
indigenous people’s incompetence to govern themselves would
permeate this government taking.
The belief that the native people were incompetent to
manage their own lands had an analogue in earlier Supreme
Court jurisprudence that dealt with the rights of Native
American tribes. For example, in Johnson v. M’Intosh, the
Supreme Court held that Native Americans only had a right of
occupancy, but no right to sell their land.165 In justifying its
decision, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
described Native Americans “as a people over whom the superior
162 For an account of the overthrow in Queen Liliuokalani’s own words, see
LILIUOKALANI, HAWAII’S STORY BYHAWAII’SQUEEN 243-51 (1898); see also Neil M. Levy,
Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 848, 862 (1975); JONATHAN K.K.
OSORIO, DISMEMBERING LAHUI: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN NATION TO 1887 (2002).
After Queen Liliuokalani’s overthrow, Hawaii eventually became a U.S. territory in
1898. See GAVAN DAWS, SHOAL OF TIME: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 289–91
(1968). Hawaii became the fiftieth state in 1959. Id. at 391. In 1993, Congress adopted a
Joint Resolution (the Apology Resolution) that acknowledged that “the overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 [occurred] with the [active] participation of
agents and citizens of the United States” and further acknowledged that “the indigenous
Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty
as a people or over their national lands to the United States, either through their
monarchy [the Kingdom of Hawaii] or through a plebiscite or referendum.” Act of Nov.
23, 1993, Pub. L. No., 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510, 1512–13 (1993).
163 See Levy, supra note 162, at 861.
164 LILIUOKALANI, supra note 162, at 178.
165 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587–88 (1823).
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genius of Europe might claim an ascendency.”166 He noted the
consequences of recognizing full ownership rights in their land
by writing that the Native American tribes were “fierce savages”
who were leaving the land fallow.167 Professor Robert Williams
describes the case as “one of the most thoroughly racist,
nonegalitarian, undemocratic, and stereotype-infused decisions
ever issued by the Supreme Court.”168 The Court’s decision was
permeated with the idea that Native Americans were too
primitive to make sensible governance decisions. Likewise, the
indigenous Hawaiian people were stripped of their land based
on a similar racist sentiment that they were not capable of self-
governance.169 Queen Liliuokalani was subsequently arrested,
tried for misprision of treason, and imprisoned.170 Today,
indigenous Hawaiians and Native Americans have an interest
in pushing for heightened scrutiny when the government
attempts to take their lands.
Connecting this history of racism and imperialism in
Hawaii to the Midkiff case, Queen Liliuokalani’s foster sister,
Bernice Pauahi, established a testamentary trust in 1883
providing schools for poor or orphaned Native Hawaiians upon
her death.171 The trustees of the Bishop Estate were the
166 Id. at 573.
167 Id. at 590.
168 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT,
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 56 (2005). Chief Justice
Marshall also expressed his views about Native Americans in two other landmark cases.
SeeWorcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832) (“After lying concealed for a series
of ages, the enterprise of Europe, guided by nautical science, conducted some of her
adventurous sons into this western world. They found it in possession of a people who had
made small progress in agriculture or manufactures, and whose general employment was
war, hunting, and fishing.”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5. Pet.) 1, 15 (1831)
(referring to Native Americans as “[a] people once numerous, powerful, and truly
independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample
domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our arms”).
169 See LILIUOKALANI, supra note 162, at 178. It is important to note that the
Native Hawaiians were not passive recipients of American colonialism. Instead, they
actively resisted. See generally e.g., NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE
HAWAIIANRESISTANCE TOAMERICANCOLONIALISM (2004) (tracing indigenous Hawaiian
resistance to colonization in the 1890s).
170 See LILIUOKALANI, supra note 162, at 267–94; see also HELENA G. ALLEN,
THE BETRAYAL OF LILIUOKALANI: LASTQUEEN OFHAWAII 1838–1917, at 321–50 (1982).
171 Pauahi’s Will, KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS, http://www.ksbe.edu/about_us/about_
pauahi/will/ [https://perma.cc/6A3J-Z7TL]. The Kamehameha Schools website notes, “When
she passed away, Pauahi’s estate comprised some 375,500 acres of land assessed at about
$474,000. Today, it includes nearly 365,800 acres of Hawai’i land and combined with other
assets is valued at $11.0 billion as of June 30, 2014.” About Pauahi, KAMEHAMEHASCHOOLS,
http://www.ksbe.edu/about_us/about_pauahi/ [https://perma.cc/T3TY-PTLK] This preference
for Native Hawaiian applicants was upheld by the Ninth Circuit in the face of a
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi
Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d 827, 849 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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landowners in Midkiff challenging the Hawaii Act.172 In their
brief to the Supreme Court, they argued:
Trustees’ land presently serves an indisputable public use. In stark
contrast, [the Hawaii Act] empowers private lessees, at their election,
to compel appropriation of Trustees’ land for purely personal
purposes. Ironically, at a time in American history when the rights
and special needs of the aboriginal population are finally receiving
recognition, this statute strikes at the jugular of a unique non-profit
trust dedicated to providing quality education for an underprivileged
native group.173
Despite these arguments, the trustees lost. This outcome was just
another instance of Hawaiian lands being taken from the
descendants of indigenous Hawaiian people and given to others.174
In short, Native Hawaiians and other indigenous peoples have an
interest in restricting the government’s power of eminent domain
to prevent such land dispossession to continue in the future.
These examples illustrate that unfair property
dispossession by the government is a civil rights issue. Indeed,
this issue has affected many racial minority groups throughout
American history. For example, Mexicans who were living
within the new boundaries of America drawn after the Mexican-
American War, even though guaranteed by the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo that their property rights “shall be
inviolably respected,”175 were robbed of their property through a
formalistic land claim procedure that was stacked against
them.176 Japanese Americans were dispossessed of their property
when they were forced to leave their homes and personal effects
behind and hastily shuttled to internment camps during World
War II.177 Asians in America, who were not eligible to apply for
172 Brief for Appellees at 3, Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
(No. 83-141).
173 Id. at 4–5 (footnotes omitted).
174 See Alfred L. Brophy, Aloha Jurisprudence: Equity Rules in Property, 85 OR.
L. REV. 771, 800 (2007) (“The legislature’s action is subject to the criticism that it was
providing additional rights to non-Native Hawaiians at the expense of trusts that own
land and rent it out for the benefit of Native Hawaiians: that it was, in essence, effecting
yet another transfer from the Native Hawaiians to others.”).
175 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII,
¶ 3, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 929 (commonly known as the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).
176 See Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties,
and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M.L. REV. 201, 209 (1996); Guadalupe T. Luna,
Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a “Naked Knife,”
4 MICH. J. RACE&L. 39, 129–33 (1998); Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural
Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLAL. REV. 1615, 1669 (2000).
177 Richard Reeves writes:
Often, the designated evacuees had just a day to put their affairs in order, to sell
or rent their houses and farms and cars—usually at a fraction of their real value.
Worse than that, thousands of families would lose their homes or farms to
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citizenship until 1952 because of the whiteness requirement in
federal naturalization law, were not allowed to own real
property due to alien land laws.178 Every one of these groups
should have an interest in curbing unfettered government
authority to construct rules that exclude them from their
property rights. This overly broad power is evidenced in
contemporary takings law and could be employed in Trump’s
efforts to construct a massive border wall.
Moreover, property dispossession takes on a special
dimension when dealing with Native American tribes because it
implicates issues of tribal sovereignty not present with other
minority groups.179 For example, if a border wall is built, the
federal government will have to condemn Tohono O’odham
land—which is deemed sacred by tribal members.180 Such
unilateral action would undermine this tribe’s ability to govern
itself. The Tohono O’odham people, which now number thirty-
four thousand enrolled members, have possessed their land
foreclosures by banks because their bank accounts were frozen by government
order. Many lost their land and work of a lifetime to plain and open thievery by
local officials and residents because California’s escheat laws allowed the state
and banks to take over “abandoned properties.” The furniture of the evacuees
and, in fact, almost everything they owned was packed into churches,
warehouses, and abandoned buildings, easy targets for thieves and vandals.
RICHARD REEVES, INFAMY: THE SHOCKING STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II 75 (2015); see also ONLY WHAT WE COULD CARRY: THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERMENT EXPERIENCE 3 (Lawson Fusao Inada, ed., 2000).
178 See IAN F. HANEY-LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THELEGALCONSTRUCTION OFRACE
129 (1996); Keith Aoki,No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Laws”
as a Prelude to Internment, 19 B.C. THIRDWORLD L.J. 37, 59–63 (1998); Gabriel J. Chin,
Citizenship and Exclusion: Wyoming’s Anti-Japanese Alien Land Law in Context, 1 WYO.
L. REV. 497, 499–505 (2001); Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At
the Intersection of Property, Race, and Citizenship, 87WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 991–94 (2010).
179 A series of three cases penned by Chief Justice John Marshall, known as the
“Marshall trilogy,” delineates the legal and political standing of Native American tribes.
SeeWorcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (holding that Georgia could not
impose its own laws on Cherokee tribal lands); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (holding that the Supreme Court did not have original jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution to hear a suit brought by the Cherokee Nation,
which was not a sovereign nation, but a “domestic dependent nation” similar to “that of
a ward to his guardian.”); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584–85 (1823)
(holding that Native American tribes had a right of occupancy on their land but they can
sell it only to the U.S. government).
180 Laurel Morales, Border Wall Would Cut Across Land Sacred to Native Tribe,
NPR (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/23/516477313/border-wall-would-cut-
across-land-sacred-to-native-tribe [https://perma.cc/M8VN-UJCE]; see also Fernanda
Santos, Border Wall Would Cleave Tribe, and Its Connection to Ancestral Land, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/us/border-wall-tribe.html
[https://perma.cc/D2M4-7QNN] (“After the Mexican-American War and then the
Gadsden Purchase in 1854 delineated the border for good, most of the tribe’s land was
left in present-day Arizona, where it still controls 2.8 million acres . . . while a smaller
piece became part of what is now the Mexican state of Sonora.”).
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since 1854.181 The Tohono O’odham Nation is currently 2.8
million acres—approximately “the size of Connecticut”—and
runs sixty-two miles along the U.S-Mexico border in Arizona.182
“Because of tribal rights,” the federal government
condemning Native American land to build a wall “would most
likely require an act of Congress.”183 The Tohono O’odham
Nation, however, opposes such a course of action. In February
2017, the Nation produced a video titled There is No O’odham
Word for Wall explaining their objections.184 In the official press
release that accompanied the video, the Nation’s Chairman
Edward D. Manuel states:
[T]he Tohono O’odham Nation can not and will not support a fortified
border wall. The Nation remains committed to working together to
protect the border using proven and successful techniques. We invite the
President and his Administration to visit theNation, see these challenges
firsthand, and begin a productive dialogue for moving forward.185
American citizens who are against broad eminent domain powers
should see the parallels in the federal government taking Native
American lands, through the enactment of federal law, and should
be aligned with the Tohono O’odham people in their fight for
sovereignty.186 Indeed, since the interests of racial minorities and
white landowners have come together on this issue, the time is ripe
for collective action that unifies these groups.
181 Santos, supra note 180.
182 Id.
183 Id.; see alsoLoneWolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority
over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning,
and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the
judicial department of the government.”).United States v. Kagama, 118U.S. 375, 382 (1886)
(“[A]fter an experience of a hundred years of the treaty-making system of government,
congress has determined upon a new departure,—to govern them by acts of congress.”).
184 Tohono O’odhamNation, There is No O’odhamWord for Wall, YOUTUBE (Feb. 18,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RQu-YEmKCN8 [https://perma.cc/8Y8T-5MF3].
185 Press Release, Tohono O’Odham Nation Office of the Chairman and Vice
Chairman, Tohono O’odham Nation Releases Video on Its Opposition to Proposed Border
Wall (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.tonation-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Press-
Release-Tohono-Oodham-Nation-Releases-Video-on-its-Opposition-to-Proposed-Border-
Wall.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW8R-U3NQ].
186 In a different context, the interests of environmentalist groups and Native
American tribes have recently converged in response to President Trump’s decision to
drastically reduce the size of two national monuments in Utah—Bears Ears National
Monument and the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument. See Trump Shrinks
National Monuments Angering Environmentalists, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42226752 [https://perma.cc/SR7K-PZAV].
Both groups are preparing legal challenges to Trump’s actions. Id.
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C. Race and Kelo v. City of New London
The interest of white landowners, like many or all of the
plaintiffs in Kelo v. City of New London, is in the protection of
their property rights from government overreach.187 This interest
is evident in Trump’s efforts to take the homes of people who live
along the U.S.-Mexico border. While this interest converges with
the interests of racial minorities in achieving racial equality, Kelo
implicates race in a different way than Berman and Midkiff.
While Berman was situated in a slum clearance project in D.C.
that primarily affected African Americans residing in the
targeted area, andMidkiff arose from a land redistribution law in
Hawaii that took land away from a trust that benefitted Native
Hawaiians,Kelo involved white landowners in Connecticut whose
property was being taken by the government for economic
redevelopment purposes.188 Although eminent domain cases
before Kelo greatly expanded takings power, public criticism was
limited because the majority did not sympathize with the
landowners in either Berman orMidkiff.189
In contrast, public reaction to Kelo was characterized by
almost ubiquitous outrage.190 Most states have subsequently
enacted post-Kelo restrictions on eminent domain.191 Eminent
domain was now generally seen by the public as a serious threat
to all Americans’ private property rights.192 However, there was
nothing new with Kelo. Such expansive uses of eminent domain
187 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).
188 See discussion infra Sections II.A.1, II.B.1.
189 Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal
Perspective on Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 56–57 (2005). (“Although the Midkiff
decision received scrutiny in the academic and legal community for arguably breaking
new ground in public use jurisprudence, there was no serious public outcry. Perhaps
there was a lack of sympathy from mainstream Americans for the wealthy landowners
of Hawaii. Likewise, in the blight cases, perhaps the average middle-class American
failed to identify with the mostly low-income communities of color that had been
displaced.” (footnotes omitted)).
190 SOMIN, supra note 106, at 137 (“Kelo was greeted by immediate and
widespread outrage.”). But seeConor Friedersdorf,Why Trusting Donald Trump on Judges
Is Folly, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/
why-trusting-donald-trump-on-judges-is-folly/494645/ [https://perma.cc/8ARW-NH7L]
(“That same year, the court’s decision was praised by a billionaire real-estate developer
[Donald Trump] with a personal interest in eminent domain. (He once tried to have the
government force a woman from her home against her will so he could build a limousine
parking lot.) He told Fox News of the ruling, ‘I happen to agree with it 100 percent.’”).
191 SOMIN, supra note 106, at 142 (“A total of forty-five states have enacted post-
Kelo eminent domain reform laws.”); see alsoMarc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail:
A Survey of State and Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38
ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 707–08 (2011).
192 SOMIN, supra note 106, at 113 (“While [the] result was consistent with
preexisting doctrine, it nonetheless made explicit a threat to ordinary middle- and
working-class homeowners that in the earlier cases seemed merely latent.”).
454 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:2
have historically been used to dispossess Native American tribes
of their land.193 Furthermore, as previously mentioned, eminent
domain has been used to dispossess African Americans of their
land.194 In the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People’s (NAACP) amicus brief submitted in Kelo, the
prominent civil rights organization emphasized how eminent
domain power has historically dispossessed racial minorities.
The NAACP asserted, “The history of eminent domain is rife
with abuse specifically targeting minority neighborhoods.
Indeed, the displacement of African-Americans and urban
renewal projects were so intertwined that ‘urban renewal’ was
often referred to as ‘Negro removal.’”195 The NAACP further
contended, “Even absent illicit motives, eminent domain power
has affected and will disproportionately affect racial and ethnic
minorities, the elderly and the economically disadvantaged.
Well-cared-for properties owned by minority and elderly
residents have repeatedly been taken so that private enterprises
could construct superstores, casinos, hotels and office parks.”196
In sum, the government has continuously dispossessed racial
minorities of their land through the use of eminent domain and
the interests of these minority groups and those of the majority
are now converging.
In his dissenting opinion in Kelo, in a rare moment of
alliance, Justice Thomas agreed with the NAACP’s arguments.
Thomas wrote that such a broad interpretation of public use
“guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor
communities.”197 Thomas recognized a racial dimension to the
inequity of such a broad interpretation of public use. He noted that
public works projects in St. Paul, Minnesota and Baltimore,
Maryland in the 1950s and ’60s decimated predominantlyminority
communities, and that theKelo holding will only “exacerbate these
193 Leeds, supra note 189, at 52 (“For centuries, American Indians have seen their
lands taken by federal and state governments without consent, and at times, without
compensation. Some Indian land takings have fallen squarely within the exercise of eminent
domain powers, but takings have routinely occurredunder other theories that provide no legal
remedy. In both situations, the underlying rationale for the takingwas the belief that Indians
were not using the land as efficiently as another owner would. In short, the ‘public good’
necessitated the taking of land from the Indians, so the land could be redistributed to others
who would make better use of the land.” (footnotes omitted)).
194 See supra Section II.A.
195 Brief for National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, et al.,
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2004) (No. 04-108) (citations omitted).
196 Id. at 9.
197 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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effects.”198 Because of these unfair results, Thomas urged for a
narrow interpretation of the Public Use Clause.199
Kelo and its aftermath show us that white landowners
have an interest in preventing such arbitrary takings. From a
property rights perspective, this interest is fundamental to the
Constitution’s conception of individual liberty.200 This interest is
now evident in the plight of the many white landowners who are
facing forced dispossession of their homes to make room for the
construction of a border wall.201
Finally, in addition to racial interests converging, other
types of convergence are occurring. For example, on August 12,
2017, hundreds of people from forty groups including property
rights organizations, environmentalists, and immigrants’ rights
advocates marched together in south Texas to protest the
construction of the borderwall.202Theywere hoping to drawnational
attention to the multi-faceted harms that will be caused by the
wall.203 This was one of the first major protests against the border
wall uniting different groups; it is likely many more will follow.
Now that various interests—especially racial minority
and majority interests—are coming together to challenge
government eminent domain power, Part III will explore some
198 Id. at 522.
199 Id. at 508.
200 See generally JAMESW. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONALHISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed., 2008).
201 See Scott Bronstein, Collette Richards, Curt Devine & Drew Griffin,
President Trump v. American Landowners on the Border, CNN (Apr. 3, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/03/us/eminent-domain-border-private-land-cases/index.html
[https://perma.cc/G5S9-A8RG]; Lauren Etter & Justin Sink, The Wall Needs the Consent
of Many, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-
02/the-wall-needs-the-consent-of-many [https://perma.cc/FT9D-H5SA]; Tracy Jan,
Trump’s ‘Big, Beautiful Wall’ Will Require Him to Take Big Swaths of Other People’s Land,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2017/03/21/trumps-big-beautiful-wall-will-require-him-to-take-big-swaths-of-other-
peoples-land/?utm_term=.7385d350cb2a [https://perma.cc/3YJ2-QBML]. Although these
articles do not explicitly mention race, it is statistically likely that many of the
landowners affected by Trump’s border wall will be white. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES OFHARVARDUNIV, supra note 114, at 4.
202 Nomaan Merchant, Advocates Stage First Big Texas Protest Against Border
Wall, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/aug/12/
advocates-stage-first-big-texas-protest-against-bo/ [http://perma.cc/4ZMW-AB78]; see also
Michael Hardy, In South Texas, Threat of Border Wall Unites Naturalists and Politicians,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/in-south-texas-threat-
of-border-wall-unites-naturalists-and-politicians.html [https://perma.cc/Q6H6-ZRJD].
203 One example of the multi-faceted harms of the construction of the border
wall, in addition to the diminishment of property rights and civil rights, would be the
environmental damage that the construction of a massive wall would create. See Erika
Bolsted, Trump’s Wall Could Cause Serious Environmental Damage, SCI. AM. (Jan. 26,
2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trumps-wall-could-cause-serious-
environmental-damage/ [https://perma.cc/MLT6-9FH6].
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possible ways forward, using the current president’s plan to take
property for a border wall as an illustrating example.
III. POSSIBLEWAYS FORWARD
This Part explores some possible ways to resist President
Trump’s proposal to take peoples’ lands for the construction of a
border wall. It will analyze different ways to either narrow the
definition of “public use” or achieve heightened scrutiny in eminent
domain cases.204 The specific strategies to implement these
possibilities are many and include things like attempted legal
reform through the courts, legislatures, and executive agencies, as
well as pushing for a constitutional amendment, pursuing
grassroots activism, and producing scholarship and other forms of
public expression that seek to raise awareness of the issue.205
204 One potential critique of a call for heightened scrutiny is that it is an
invocation of a return to the Lochner era, where the Supreme Court, under a Substantive
Due Process analysis, applied heightened scrutiny to a state law prohibiting bakery
employees from working more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week. See
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (“The mere assertion that the subject relates
though but in a remote degree to the public health does not necessarily render the
enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and
the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate . . . .”). In applying heightened
scrutiny, the Court concluded that the law was not “a fair, reasonable and appropriate
exercise” of the state’s police power. Id. at 56–57. Lochner has been much derided as an
example of judicial overreach. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of
Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 536–37 (2015) (summarizing criticism). A full
response to this critique is beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief point is
worth mentioning. Even during the Lochner era, the Supreme Court upheld certain state
regulations that it deemed vital to prevent certain harms—i.e., they were valid exercises
to state power. James Ely writes:
It bears emphasizing that the outcome in Lochner did not bar all legislative
reform. . . . The Supreme Court, for instance, was receptive to laws dealing
with obvious health and safety risks, even when such regulations imposed
heavy costs on property owners or businesses. The justices upheld the
regulation of safety in mines and worker’s compensation that provided for a
financial award to employees injured by industrial accidents. Moreover, the
Supreme Court sustained state laws that required the payment of wages in
money rather than script, brushing aside a liberty of contract argument. The
Court also took a deferential view with respect to state supervision of public
morals. . . . Nor did the Supreme Court see any constitutional infirmity with
laws to prevent fraudulent business practices.
ELY, supra note 200, at 108–09. In the same way, applying heightened scrutiny in
takings cases does not necessarily give courts unfettered power over the other branches
of government. Indeed, such scrutiny serves as a check against executive and legislative
overreach in the eminent domain context.
205 The main point of this article is to argue that we have reached a moment of
interest-convergence to collectively push for a change in eminent domain law. Detailed
analysis of the strategies to accomplish this goal are beyond the scope of this article.
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A. A Narrow Interpretation of the Public Use Doctrine
One possible way forward to limit federal eminent
domain power is to push for a narrow interpretation of public
use. Justice Thomas articulates a narrow definition in his Kelo
dissent by writing, “The most natural reading of the Clause is
that it allows the government to take property only if the
government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the
property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or
necessity whatsoever.”206 This narrow interpretation could curb
economic development takings, such as the one at issue in Kelo,
but it would not provide any restriction on the federal
government’s proposal to take private property to build a
border wall.207 Under a narrow interpretation of public use, so
long as the federal government owned and used the land taken,
it would be a permissible exercise of eminent domain. If Trump
takes property through eminent domain and keeps it in federal
hands to build a border wall, then even a narrow reading of
public use would not provide any protection to the landowners.
This is because a narrow interpretation would not prevent poor
government decision making.
A primary reason to restrict the government’s eminent
domain power is to provide a fetter against ineffective government
plans that would lead to the unnecessary dispossession of property.
Rather than arguing that government lacks any power to condemn
land, this article asserts that the government should be put to its
proof to take this drastic action because people’s property rights are
at stake. It is likely that many people would vigorously object if
their homes were taken with little evidence that the taking would
accomplish the government’s stated purpose.
There is ample evidence that a border wall would not be
effective in decreasing the number of unauthorized immigrants
from Mexico in this country. For example, researchers Ana
Gonzalez-Barrera and Jen Manuel Krogstad found, in a study
for the Pew Research Center, that “[t]he number of Mexican
immigrants living in [this country] illegally has declined bymore
than [one] million since 2007.”208 In fiscal year 2016, “more non-
206 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 508 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207 Ilya Somin proposes to ban economic development and blight takings
altogether, but notes that while it will improve the situation, it “will not eliminate all
eminent domain abuse.” See SOMIN, supra note 106, at 204–05.
208 Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad,What We Know About Illegal
Immigration fromMexico, PEWRES. CTR. (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/03/02/what-we-know-about-illegal-immigration-from-mexico/ [https://perma.cc/
W8MR-G4HY]. “In 2014, 5.8 million unauthorized immigrants from Mexico lived in the
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Mexicans than Mexicans were apprehended at U.S. borders,”
with 192,969 Mexicans apprehended, which represents “a sharp
drop from a peak of 1.6 million apprehensions” sixteen years
earlier.209 The authors note, “The decline in apprehensions reflects
the decrease in the number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants
coming to the U.S.”210 These numbers suggest that a border wall
will not be effective in reducing a population of people coming to
the United States whose numbers have been declining on their
own. Further, “unauthorized immigrants are more likely to be
long-term residents of the U.S. As of 2014, 78% had lived in [this
country] for ten years ormore, while only 7% had been in the [U.S.]
for less than five years.”211 If the vast majority of undocumented
immigrants are long-term residents of this country, then a border
wall will do little to decrease the number.
In an article in the American Journal of Sociology, scholars
Douglas Massey, Karen Pren, and Jorge Durand argue that more
forceful immigration enforcement policy starting in 1986 has
served to increase, not decrease, the number of unauthorized
immigrants from Mexico.212 Massey, Duran, and Pren explain:
The principal substantive finding of our analysis is that border
enforcement was not an efficacious strategy for controlling Mexican
immigration to the United States, to say the least. Indeed, it backfired
by cutting off a long-standing tradition of migratory circulation and
promoting the large-scale settlement of undocumented migrants who
otherwise would have continued moving back and forth across the
border.213
In addition, to the extent that the wall is supposed to deter crime
at the border,214 policy experts have expressed doubts that a
physical wall would reduce drug trafficking,215 human
U.S., down from a peak of 6.9million [seven years earlier].” Id. (emphasis added). However,




212 Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand & Karen A. Pren, Why Border
Enforcement Backfired, 121 AM. J. SOC. 1557, 1557–58, 1590 (2016).
213 Id. at 1590; see also David Bier, A Wall Is an Impractical, Expensive, and
Ineffective Border Plan, CATO INST. (Nov. 28, 2016, 2:31 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/
border-wall-impractical-expensive-ineffective-plan [https://perma.cc/55YG-X4TY] (arguing
that a border wall will not be effective in reducing illegal immigration or drug trafficking).




(“Mexico was just ranked the second deadliest country in the world, after only Syria.
Drug trade is largely the cause. We will BUILD THE WALL!”).
215 See Ron Nixon, As Trump Calls for Wall on Mexican Border, Smugglers Dig
Tunnels, N.Y. TIMES (Sept, 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/us-mexico-
border-wall-tunnels.html [https://perma.cc/N7KZ-G9NP]; Ron Nixon, Homeland
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trafficking,216 or terrorism.217 Finally, although the president has
repeatedly promised a large physical wall to keep people out,
both lawmakers and other federal officials have consistently
questioned the efficacy and cost of such an undertaking.218
Nonetheless, if a narrow interpretation of the public use doctrine
were adopted, none of the evidence of the proposed border wall’s
ineffectiveness would matter. Courts would simply defer to the
fact that the taken land would be in government hands.
B. Racial Animus and the Trump Presidency
Given the strong evidence against building a wall, what
can explain Trump’s relentless pursuit of an incredibly costly
measure that will not be effective in achieving the president’s
policy goals? One plausible reason is that Trump’s proposal is
based on racial animus.219 In other words, Trump’s purported
goal of curbing illegal immigration is just a pretext for racial
animus against people of Mexican descent. Evidence for such
animus abounds in Trump’s own words. For example, Trump
stated at a speech announcing his bid for president:
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re
not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that
Security Secretary Says Border Wall Alone Will Not Work, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/homeland-security-john-kelly-border-
wall.html [https://perma.cc/5F3X-239P]; Roberto Saviano, Why a Mexican Border Wall
Won’t Stop the Drug Cartels, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://
www.newsweek.com/2017/03/17/why-mexican-border-wall-wont-stop-drug-cartels-5
64112.html [https://perma.cc/4EBD-QATG].
216 See Kalhan Rosenblatt, Will Trump’s Border Wall Prevent Human
Trafficking? Experts Aren’t Sure, NBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017, 4:29 PM EDT), http://www.
nbcnews.com/news/us-news/will-trump-s-border-wall-prevent-human-trafficking-experts-
aren-n751466 [https://perma.cc/6ZUT-CHNT].
217 See Eric Schmitt & Linda Qiu, Fact Check: The Trump Administration’s
Argument for a Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/
27/us/politics/fact-check-trump-border-wall-mexico.html [https://perma.cc/ADM3-MQ23].
218 Scott Bronstein, Curt Devine & Drew Griffin, Trump Wants a Wall. Border
Experts Want a Fence, CNN (Feb. 16. 2017, 6:49 PM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2017/
02/16/politics/trump-border-wall/index.html [https://perma.cc/XZ7M-VU4P] (quoting
Border Patrol officials that state that a fence would be more sensible than a wall); Adam
Hartung,Why President Trump’s Border Wall Is an Example of Bad Leadership, FORBES
(Jan. 28, 2017, 8:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamhartung/2017/01/28/why-
president-trumps-border-wall-is-an-example-of-bad-leadership/ [https://perma.cc/XEG9-
6QEJ] (“Interestingly, the state with the longest Mexican border is Texas—and of its 38
congressional members (36 in Congress, 2 in the Senate and 25 Republican) not one (not
one) supports building the wall.”).
219 Here, racial animus can take two forms: either Trump’s own personal
animus or, conversely, the animus of Trump’s supporters that he caters to by continually
promising that a wall will be built and that Mexico will pay for it. For my analysis, it
makes no difference—I will treat them as one and the same. If either or both types of
animus lead to the unfair taking of private property and the government trampling on
other rights, then it must be checked.
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have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us.
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And
some, I assume, are good people.220
Furthermore, during his presidential campaign, two men
urinated on a sleeping Latino man and then assaulted him with
a metal pole.221 At the police station, one of the men stated,
“‘Donald Trump was right; all these illegals need to be
deported.’”222 When asked about the incident, instead of
denouncing the attackers, Trump said, “I will say that people
who are following me are very passionate. They love this country
and they want this country to be great again. They are
passionate.”223 These comments demonstrate the racial animus
of both Trump and his base.
Moreover, then-candidate Trump refused to answer
questions about immigration from Jorge Ramos, a Mexican
American reporter at the Spanish-language news channel
Univision and told Ramos to “Go back to Univision” before Trump’s
bodyguard forcibly removed Ramos from the room.224 In addition,
then-candidate Trump made public statements against the fitness
of a Mexican American judge, who was born in Indiana, to hear a
pending case in which Trumpwas a defendant based on the judge’s
racial background.225 Specifically, Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel was
presiding over a fraud class action case brought “by former
students of Trump University” when Trump asserted that the
judge had a conflict of interest because the judge’s family was of
Mexican heritage and the judge would, therefore, be biased against
220 Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech, TIME (June 16, 2015),
http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/ [https://perma.cc/TDK2-6XPL].
221 AdrianWalker, ‘Passionate’ TrumpFansBehindHomelessMan’s Beating?, BOS.





224 Phillip Rucker, First, Trump Booted Univision Anchor Jorge Ramos Out of
His News Conference. Then Things Got Interesting, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/08/25/first-trump-booted-
univision-anchor-jorge-ramos-out-of-his-news-conference-then-things-got-interesting/
[https://perma.cc/X7A3-7DTB]. Also, then-candidate Trump responded to a question
about immigration at a presidential debate by stating, “We have some bad hombres here,
and we’re going to get them out.” Katie Zezima, Trump on Immigration: There Are ‘Bad
Hombres’ in the United States, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2016), (internal quotation marks
omitted) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/19/trump-on-
immigration-there-are-bad-hombres-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/4P3L-7X9H].
225 Alan Rappeport, That Judge Attacked by Donald Trump? He’s Faced a Lot
Worse, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2016), (internal quotation marks omitted) https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trump-university-judge-gonzalo-curiel.html
[https://perma.cc/KSP6-NMSV].
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Trump because of his plans to build a border wall.226 Trump
repeated this sentiment in a televised interview on CNN.227 He
later claimed that his comments were somehow “misconstrued.”228
Trump’s statements evidencing racial animus have
continued into his presidency. In a discussion of how to prosecute
immigrants living in sanctuary cities, President Trump stated:
You wouldn’t believe how bad these people are. These aren’t people.
These are animals. And we’re taking them out of the country at a level
and at a rate that’s never happened before. And because of the weak
laws, they come in fast, we get them, we release them, we get them
again, we bring them out. It’s crazy.229
Finally, on August 25, 2017, President Trump pardoned Joe
Arpaio, the former Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona who was
to be sentenced to criminal contempt of court for failing to comply
with a federal judge’s order to stop racially profiling Latinos.230
After the pardon, Trump tweeted that Arpaio was an “American
patriot . . . [who] kept Arizona safe!”231 These examples illustrate
exactly why heightened scrutiny is necessary to root out Trump’s
racially discriminatory decision making.
In a different context that highlights the value of
heightened scrutiny over federal government action in the
context of racial animus, a federal district court in New York has
226 Id.
227 Donald Trump Rails Against Judge’s ‘Mexican Heritage,’ CNN (June 3,
2016), http://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2016/06/03/donald-trump-judge-mexican-
trump-university-case-lead-sot.cnn [https://perma.cc/3WFJ-CK8B].
228 Alan Rappeport, Donald Trump Says His Remarks on Judge Were
‘Misconstrued,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/us/
politics/trump-university-judge.html [https://perma.cc/AK76-37EB].
229 President Donald Trump, Remarks at a California Sanctuary State
Roundtable (May 16, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-california-sanctuary-state-roundtable/ [https://perma.cc/H8X2-RTTH].
Trump’s Press Secretary, Sarah Sanders, later explained, “The President was very clearly
referring to MS-13 gang members who enter the country illegally and whose deportations
are hamstrung by our laws.” Sarah Sanders, White House Press Sect., Press Briefing
(May 17, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-press-
secretary-sarah-sanders-acting-secretary-veterans-affairs-robert-wilkie-05172018/
[https://perma.cc/WC2M-GX8S]; cf. Linda Qiu, The Context Behind Trump’s ‘Animals’
Comment, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/us/politics/
fact-check-trump-animals-immigration-ms13-sanctuary-cities.html [https://perma.cc/
22VU-Z2M5] (arguing that the Press Secretary’s explanation of the President’s “animals”
comment do not make sense in the context of state sanctuary laws that would not protect
the examples of violent criminals that the press secretary cites in her explanation).
230 Julie Hirschfield Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio,
Who Became Face of Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trump-pardon-sheriff-
arizona.html [https://perma.cc/3HDZ-WZBG].
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allowed a case to proceed to challenge Trump’s decision to end
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program.232 A
number of federal circuit courts, under a heightened scrutiny
standard, have also enjoined Trump’s travel bans as a violation
of the Establishment Clause because they found anti-Muslim
animus infused in the government’s actions.233
Given these examples of Trump’s racial animosity, this
article argues that the courts should stop applying such a
deferential standard to the government’s actions and instead
apply heightened scrutiny to provide a judicial limitation on the
federal government’s eminent domain power. Trump should not
232 See Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 278 (E.D.N.Y 2018) (“At the
very least, one might reasonably infer that a [presidential] candidate who makes overtly
bigoted statements on the campaign trail might be more likely to engage in similarly
bigoted action once in office.”); see also Alan Feuer, Citing Trump’s ‘Racial Slurs,’ Judge
Says Suit to Preserve DACA Can Continue, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/nyregion/daca-lawsuit-trump-brooklyn.html [https://
perma.cc/WX5N-P5FV]. Federal courts in San Francisco, New York, and D.C. have blocked
Trump’s attempt to end DACA and the Supreme Court is unlikely to hear Trump’s appeal.
See Pete Williams, Supreme Court Unlikely to Hear Trump DACA Appeal, NBC NEWS,
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-unlikely-
hear-trump-daca-appeal-n960321 [https://perma.cc/9ZQ2-XAX3].
233 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572, 590 (4th
Cir.) (sustaining the district court’s nationwide injunction by applying “meaningful
judicial review” of a travel ban that the Fourth Circuit characterized as “that in text
speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips with religious
intolerance, animus, and discrimination.”) vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.);
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 769 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming in part the district court’s
preliminary injunction against the President’s travel ban in which the district court
found, “A review of the historical background here makes plain why the Government
wishes to focus on the Executive Order’s text, rather than its context. The record before
this Court is unique. It includes significant and unrebutted evidence of religious animus
driving the promulgation of the Executive Order and its related predecessor.” Hawaii v.
Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1136 (D. Haw. 2017)), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 377
(2017) (mem.). These cases were later consolidated and the Supreme Court granted cert.
See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2085 (2017) (As part of
this opinion, the Supreme Court modified the preliminary injunctions issued by the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits by narrowing their scope.). Id. The Trump administration
subsequently changed its travel ban (for a third time) and the Supreme Court allowed
this iteration to go into effect while legal challenges were pending. See Adam Liptak,
Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/YRX9-TDJZ]. In a subsequent 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld
the President’s authority to issue the travel ban and rejected the Establishment Clause
challenge. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). Justice Sotomayor, in a strong
dissenting opinion, observed, “Taking all the relevant evidence together, a reasonable
observer would conclude that the Proclamation was driven primarily by anti-Muslim
animus, rather than by the Government’s asserted national-security justifications.” Id. at
2438 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Recently, a prominent Trump supporter cited Japanese
American interment in a televised interview “as a ‘precedent’ for an immigrant registry.”
See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Trump Camp’s Talk of Registry and Japanese Internment
Raises Muslim Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
18/us/politics/japanese-internment-muslim-registry.html [https://perma.cc/WBY8-FQUY].
This is another example of how excessive judicial deference to the federal government’s
claims of national security can be dangerous.
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be allowed to make decisions based on racial animus and hide
under the cloak of public use—especially when his border wall
would not do much to achieve his purported ends.
C. Heightened Judicial Scrutiny in Eminent Domain Cases
A possible way forward, which is more effective than
narrowing the definition of “public use,” is to apply heightened
judicial scrutiny to the government’s decision to condemn land.
This Part explores two possibilities for achieving heightened
scrutiny in eminent domain cases—means-ends analysis and
strict scrutiny.
1. Means-Ends Analysis in Eminent Domain Cases
First, federal courts could apply a form of heightened
scrutiny by using means-ends analysis, which entails analyzing
the government action that is taken to achieve a public policy
goal (the means), and the policy goal put forth by the
government (the ends).
Professor Thomas Merrill argues that judicial review in
eminent domain cases should focus on the means that the
government chooses, rather than the ends.234 Merrill begins by
focusing on a distinction “drawn by Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed between property rules, which allow an owner to
protect a right or entitlement from an unconsented taking by
securing injunctive relief, and liability rules, which afford
protection only through an ex post award of damages.”235 In
critiquing “the extreme deference to legislative eminent domain
decisions,” Merrill notes that courts have relied exclusively on
liability rules to “protect all private property rights.”236 He
argues that the fundamental source of this extreme deference
and subsequent overreliance on liability rules is a focus on ends
rather than on means. Merrill argues that deference to ends may
be proper,237 but urges a more searching inquiry on means.238
234 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
61, 65 (1986).
235 See id. at 64 (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One Vies of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1092 (1972)).
236 Id.
237 Id. at 66–67 (“The ends questions asks what the government plans to do once
the property is obtained. This inquiry, in turn, requires a clear conception of the legitimate
functions or purposes of the state. . . . The answers to such questions demand an exercise
in high political theory that most courts today are unwilling (or unable) to undertake.”).
238 Id. at 67 (“The means question, by contrast, is narrower. It asks where and
how the government should get property, not what it may do with it. . . . The means
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This heightened scrutiny of means has a parallel in some
state courts. For example, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, the
Michigan Supreme Court set forth a heightened standard for
judicial scrutiny in eminent domain cases that asks whether the
taking was necessary to achieve the ends that the government
was pursuing.239 In Hathcock, landowners challenged Wayne
County’s exercise of eminent domain for purposes of clearing
land for the Pinnacle Project—which entailed “constructing a
large business and technology park with a conference center,
hotel accommodations, and a recreational facility.”240 Hathcock
overruled an infamous case, Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, which involved the condemnation of property for
the construction of a General Motors plant in Detroit,
Michigan.241 Citing to the broad discretion given to government
in its eminent domain decisions, the majority in Poletown held
for the state, noting, “The power of eminent domain is to be used
in this instance primarily to accomplish the essential public
purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the
economic base of the community. The benefit to a private
interest is merely incidental.”242 This is essentially an ends
analysis, in which the government is afforded great deference to
act in the public interest.243
Poletown, serving as a state-level precursor to Kelo, was
met with widespread outrage.244 Perhaps reflecting conflicting
societal views on the outcome, also like Kelo, the decision itself
was not unanimous. The majority opinion in Poletown was met
with two vigorous dissents.245 In his dissent, Justice Ryan
criticized “the always disastrous philosophy that the end
justifies the means.”246 Ryan’s opinion thus suggested that
approach, of course, is also ‘political’ in that it concerns state actions that will advance
or retard conflicting interests. Nevertheless, the means approach demands a more
narrowly focused and judicially manageable inquiry than the ends approach.”).
239 Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 776 (Mich. 2004).
240 Id. at 770. The Pinnacle Project was expected to “create thirty thousand jobs
and add $350 million in tax revenue.” Id. at 771.
241 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 468, 470
(Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 459.
243 See supra notes 234–238 and accompanying text.
244 Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic
Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 623, 624–25
(2006) (“Like Poletown before it, Kelo was met with public outrage, despite the fact that
it arguably made few changes to existing federal Takings Clause jurisprudence.”).
245 Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 N.W.2d at 460–464 (Fitzgerald, J.,
dissenting); id. at 464–84 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 465. Justice Ryan further criticized the substantial influence of
General Motors in the government’s exercise of eminent domain powers. Id. at 470 (“The
evidence then is that what General Motors wanted, General Motors got. The corporation
conceived the project, determined the cost, allocated the financial burdens, selected the
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means along with ends should be evaluated by courts. Ryan then
articulated three factors that would allow for the transfer of
condemned properties to private parties: “1) public necessity of
the extreme sort; 2) continuing accountability to the public; and
3) selection of land according to facts of independent public
significance.”247 All three factors were types of means analysis.
Justice Ryan noted that the majority decision failed to
recognize, let alone apply, any of these means-focused factors.248
He warned that the now greatly expanded concept of “public
benefit” has no limits.249 Ryan’s analysis would later become the
basis of Poletown’s reversal.250
Twenty-three years after Poletown, the Michigan
Supreme Court was faced with the same issue.251 In County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, Wayne County was attempting to take
private land to clear the way for a business center.252 The county
put forth the following purposes or ends for the condemnations:
(1) the creation of jobs for its citizens, (2) the stimulation of private
investment and redevelopment in the county to insure a healthy and
growing tax base so that the county can fund and deliver critical public
services, (3) stemming the tide of disinvestment and population loss,
and (4) supporting development opportunities which would otherwise
remain unrealized.253
While conceding that these goals were within the scope of the
county’s powers, the court held that the exercise of eminent
domain was not legally permissible because they failed under
site, established the mode of financing, imposed specific deadlines for clearance of the
property and taking title, and even demanded [twelve] years of tax concessions.”).
247 Id. at 478. Ryan described public necessity of the extreme sort as “the
exercise of eminent domain for private corporations has been limited to those enterprises
generating public benefits whose very existence depends on the use of the land that can
be assembled only by the coordination central government alone is capable of achieving.”
Id. Next, he defines continuing public accountability as “the retention of some measure
of government control over the operation of the enterprise after it has passed into private
hands.” Id. at 479. Finally, Ryan explains choosing the land based on facts of
independent significance as the “determination of the specific land to be condemned is
made without reference to the private interests of the corporation. The determination is
based instead upon criteria related to the public interest.” Id. at 480.
248 Id. at 480 (“The three elements discussed above are not recognized by the
majority, which instead has tied the concept of public use to the existence of a public benefit.
Yet, the principles inhering in the precedent demonstrate that, although public benefit is
a necessary condition, it is itself an insufficient condition for the existence of a public use.”).
249 Id. at 480. (“From now on ‘the protean concept of public benefit’ will be the
sole criterion by which we are to adjudge the constitutionality of employing eminent
domain for private corporations. The concept of public benefit is indeed protean. It is also
nebulous. The state taking clause has now been placed on a spectrum that admits of no
principles and therefore no limits.”).
250 See Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 781, 785–87 (Mich. 2004).
251 Id. at 769.
252 Id. at 770.
253 Id. at 775–76.
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the three means-based factors that Justice Ryan analyzed in his
Poletown dissent.254 Poletownwas, therefore, overruled and state
law subsequently required courts to scrutinize the means of
taking private property that the government chose when
exercising its eminent domain power.255
Applying the Hathcock means-ends analysis to the
president’s plan to take private property for the construction of
a border wall, a court would give deference to the government’s
stated goals of preventing illegal border crossing and deterring
crime in general. The federal government, however, would have
to demonstrate that the means chosen furthered these stated
goals in a meaningful way. In other words, deference would not
be given to the government’s means. A court would have to
analyze the government’s evidence to determine how the border
wall would further the president’s ends. In this historic moment
of interest-convergence, both minority and non-minority voices
should be pushing back against the taking of private property
for a massive construction project that will not accomplish the
president’s stated policy objectives. They should do this in
recognition that unfettered government eminent domain
authority is detrimental from both a civil rights standpoint and
a property rights perspective.
Furthermore, in another context analyzed under takings
law, means-ends analysis has been utilized by the Supreme
Court when considering the constitutionality of exactions, or
certain conditions placed on government permission for private
parties to build on and develop property. The Court, therefore,
in at least certain types of takings cases has applied a form of
heightened scrutiny.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Nollans
were private landowners who “own[ed] a beachfront lot in
Ventura County, California.”256 In order to raze the existing
structure and build a new house on their land, a state statute
“required [the Nollans] to obtain a coastal development permit
from the California Coastal Commission.”257 The commission
granted the development permit on the condition that the
Nollans allow the public a right-of-way easement across a
portion of their property in order to access the beaches.258 The
Nollans challenged this condition in court as an uncompensated
taking in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
254 Id. at 781–83.
255 Id. at 787.
256 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
257 Id. at 828.
258 Id.
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Amendment.259 The Supreme Court held for the Nollans and
found that a taking had occurred by applying a means-ends
analysis.260 While accepting the state’s purported ends (or policy
goal) “that the public interest [would] be served by a continuous
strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast,”261 the Court
observed that the exaction would be impermissible if the
“essential nexus” between the means and ends was missing—
i.e., when the means “utterly fails to further the end[s].”262 The
Court noted, “When that essential nexus is eliminated, the
situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting
fire in a crowded theater [which would be a proper exercise of
police power], but granted dispensations to those willing to
contribute $100 to the state treasury [which would be
impermissible].”263 In other words, the Court was looking for a
strong connection between the means and the ends to justify the
government taking of property.
The Court found that the essential nexus in this case was
not satisfied because the ends of physical public access to the
beach would not be satisfied by a means (i.e., a land use
condition) that would allow only for visual access and the
prevention of a psychological barrier to physical access.264 In
other words, the connection between ends and means was too
attenuated for the takings conclusion to be avoided.
Seven years later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court
elaborated on the questions the Court must ask to determine if
an exaction constitutes a government taking.265 In Dolan,
“Florence Dolan own[ed] a plumbing and electric supply store”
in Tigard, Oregon.266 She sought to raze her existing 9,700-
square foot store and construct another building almost double
the size of the original.267 The city granted Dolan’s request
subject to two conditions: (1) she dedicate a portion of her
property “for improvement of a storm drainage system” along a
259 Id. at 829.
260 Id. at 841–42 (“California is free to advance its ‘comprehensive program,’ if it
wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this ‘public purpose,’; but if it wants an
easement across the Nollans’ property, it must pay for it.” (citing U.S. CONST. amend V.)).
261 Id. at 841.
262 Id. at 837.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 838. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan disagreed with the
majority’s characterization that the benefit of the public easement was restricted to
visual and psychological access, and cites to instances in which the commission requested
the easement because it wanted to increase physical access to the beaches. Id. at 850–51
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
265 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994).
266 Id. at 379.
267 See id.
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flooding area near her property; and (2) “she dedicate [a fifteen]-
foot strip of land . . . as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.”268 Dolan
challenged these conditions as an uncompensated taking of her
property under the Fifth Amendment.269
The Court expounded upon the essential nexus test of
Nollan, setting forth a two-part inquiry. The Court “must first
determine whether the ‘essential nexus’ exists between the
‘legitimate state interest’ and the permit condition exacted by
the city.”270 Under the first inquiry, the Court found that an
essential nexus existed between the legitimate interests of the
prevention of flooding and the reduction of traffic congestion and
the imposed permit conditions.271 The Court then described the
second part of the analysis in which the Court is “to determine
whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city’s
permit conditions bears the required relationship to the
projected impact of petitioner’s proposed development.”272 The
Court further explained that “rough proportionality” was the
required degree of connection between ends and means for Fifth
Amendment purposes.273 Under the second inquiry, the Court
found that the permit conditions were not “roughly proportional”
to the impact of the proposed development.274 Therefore, the
exactions amounted to uncompensated taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
Professor Nicole Garnett argues that the heightened
scrutiny from Nollan and Dolan should also be applied when a
challenge arises to a government’s eminent domain power.275
Garnett contends that the heightened scrutiny required in
exactions cases is an attempt “to ensure that the property owner
would bear no more than his or her ‘fair share’ of the burden of
regulation.”276 She argues that this “singling out” of landowners
in exactions cases applies equally, if not more, to landowners in
268 Id. at 380.
269 Id. at 382.
270 Id. at 386 (citation omitted).
271 Id. at 387–88.
272 Id. at 388 (citations omitted).
273 Id. at 391. The Court eschewed the term “reasonable relationship” because
it “seems confusingly similar to the term ‘rational basis’ which described the minimal
level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
The Court elaborated, “No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” Id.
274 Id. at 395–96.
275 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 963 (2003).
276 Id. at 943.
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eminent domain cases.277 Garnett draws on Nollan and Dolan
and articulates a “reasonable necessity” test, as applied to
eminent domain cases:
Can the government link the means by which and purpose for which
it seeks to acquire land? That is, can the government demonstrate that
a given exercise of eminent domain was “reasonably necessary” to
advance, or “related in nature and extent” to, the public purpose for
which the condemnation power was invoked?278
Applying Garnett’s proposed test to the federal government’s
taking of private property to build a border wall, a court would
ask if the taking was “reasonably necessary” or “related in
nature and extent” to the President’s stated purpose of stopping
illegal border crossing or deterring crime. Again, deference will
be given to the stated ends, but none will be afforded to the
means the government has chosen to accomplish them. In this
moment of interest-convergence, people from all racial
backgrounds should contest the idea that the border wall is
reasonably necessary for the President’s stated objectives.
Indeed, allowing government extreme deference in choosing this
means puts everyone’s property rights in jeopardy.
Therefore, heightened judicial scrutiny based on either
Hathcock orNollan andDolanwould move away from the extreme
deference given to government discretion in Berman,Midkiff, and
Kelo and put the government to its proof that its means were
reasonably necessary or in some way connected to the stated ends.
2. Strict Scrutiny in Eminent Domain Cases
a. Triggering Strict Scrutiny
Another way forward is to apply strict scrutiny analysis in
eminent domain cases. Strict scrutiny can be triggered when the
277 Id. at 950 (“In fact, some individuals forced to involuntarily part with their
property in an eminent-domain proceeding may be worse off than those who face an
aggressive regulatory authority that has ‘singled them out’ for a development exaction.”).
278 Id. at 964. Garnett further explains:
First, at the broadest level, a court might review whether the larger project for
which the property is being condemned is reasonably necessary to advance the
government’s policy goals. . . . Alternatively, a reasonable necessity test might
require courts to ask a means-ends question familiar from other areas of
constitutional law—that is, whether the government’s actions are
“overinclusive” (or, at least theoretically, “underinclusive”). . . . Finally, aside
from scrutiny of the amount of land acquired, means-ends scrutiny in a public-
use case might entail an evaluation of whether the government could have
acquired the land in question through other, noncoercive, means.
Id. at 966–67 (footnotes omitted).
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government impinges on fundamental rights.279 The fundamental
right at issue in challenges to government eminent domain power
is the individual right to own property.280 In addition to the
Takings Clause, Professor Michael Lang argues that this right
can be implied from several provisions of the Constitution,
including the Third Amendment’s stringent restrictions on
quartering troops in people’s homes, the Fourth Amendment’s
protection of houses and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’
protection against deprivations of property without due process of
law.281 Taken together, these constitutional provisions would
create a fundamental right to own property in the same way the
Supreme Court has used a number of constitutional protections
to imply the fundamental right of privacy.282
An alternative way to trigger strict scrutiny is for a court
to frame the issue based on the personal and unique nature of
what a home means to people. Legal scholar Margaret Radin, in
theorizing a personhood perspective in property law, makes a
279 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held
to be embraced within the Fourteenth.” (citations omitted)). Carolene Products upheld
an economic regulation by applying rational basis review, but noted that heighted
scrutiny may be proper in other situations—namely when fundamental rights are
infringed or when “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” is present. Id. at
153 n.4. It is interesting to note that this case created a dichotomy between economic
rights, which are subject to rational basis review, and individual liberty rights, which
are subject to heightened scrutiny. A number of scholars have critiqued this as a false
dichotomy and have argued that the infringement of economic (i.e., property) rights
should receive the same heightened scrutiny as individual liberty rights. See, e.g.,
RICHARDA. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATEPROPERTY AND THEPOWER OFEMINENTDOMAIN
211 (1985); ELY, supra note 200, at 140–41.
280 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J.
555, 609 (1997) (Arguing that “the recognition of fundamental property rights should be
analytically similar to the recognition of fundamental liberty interests.”); Michael A.
Lang, Note, Taking Back Eminent Domain: Using Heightened Scrutiny to Stop Eminent
Domain Abuse, 39 IND. L. REV. 449, 461 (2006) (“Although the Federal Constitution was
established to protect individual rights to life and liberty, it was also created to protect
private property rights.” (footnote omitted)). Some states have interpreted their own
constitutions as recognizing property as a fundamental right and, therefore, providing
heightened scrutiny analysis in challenges to eminent domain power. See, e.g., City of
Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1129, 1138 (Ohio 2006) (applying heightened
scrutiny after recognizing that property is a “fundamental right” under the Ohio
Constitution.); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 650–51
(Okla. 2006) (applying heightened scrutiny after recognizing an “individual fundamental
interest of private property ownership” under the Oklahoma Constitution).
281 Lang, supra note 280, at 461–62.
282 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“In varying contexts, the
Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right [to
privacy] in the First Amendment; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights; in the Ninth Amendment; or in the concept of liberty
guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
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distinction between “personal” property, as defined as “some
object . . . so bound up with me that I would cease to be ‘myself’
if it were taken” and fungible property, meaning property not
“specially related to persons.”283 Radin gives a home as an
example of “personal” property and argues that, as such, strict
scrutiny should apply to a government taking of a home.284
Similarly, the idea that homes are special sources of security,
liberty, and privacy can support the application of strict
scrutiny.285 Legal scholar Benjamin Barros argues that given
these unique characteristics, eminent domain law does not
sufficiently protect people’s personal interest in their home.286
Barros, therefore, urges “higher levels of judicial scrutiny and
additional process protections to better ensure that homes taken
by use of eminent domain are in fact required for public use.”287
Thus, in government takings of people’s homes based
either on property as a fundamental right or the unique and
personal nature of a home, strict scrutiny would be the proper
standard of review. This heightened judicial review should serve
as a shield for both racial minorities and white landowners
whose interests have converged to stop the taking of their homes
by the federal government.
b. Applying Strict Scrutiny
When strict scrutiny is applied, a government regulation
may be “justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’
and . . . legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”288 One major
difference between strict scrutiny and means-ends analysis is
283 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1005
(1982). Radin gives the following “personal” property example:
If my kidney may be called my property, it is not property subject to
condemnation for the general public welfare. Hence, in the context of a legal
system, one might expect to find the characteristic use of standards of review
and burdens of proof designed to shift risk of error away from protected
interests in personal property. For instance, if there were reason to suspect
that some object were close to the personal end of the continuum, there might
be a prima facie case against taking it. That prima facie case might be rebutted
if the government could show that the object is not personal, or perhaps that
the object is not “too” personal compared with the importance to the
government of acquiring that particular object for social purposes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
284 Id. at 1005–06.
285 D. Benjamin Barros,Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTACLARA L. REV. 255,
259–75 (2006).
286 Id. at 295.
287 Id.
288 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted).
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that strict scrutiny eschews the traditional judicial deference
given to the states in determining ends and applies the highest
review to both ends and means. In other words, the government
is put to its proof that both its ends are compelling, and its means
selected to achieve those ends are narrowly tailored.289 As for the
president’s stated objectives of preventing illegal immigration
and deterring crime, these will most likely be deemed compelling
government interests. The narrow tailoring prong of strict
scrutiny, however, will pose the most significant hurdle for the
government to overcome. Indeed, the narrow tailoring test is a
much more searching inquiry into the government’s means than
the other means-ends tests presented in this article.290
If strict scrutiny applied to eminent domain cases, legal
scholar Michael Lang proposes a sensible three-prong test
specific to such cases.291 First, the government must show that
the use of eminent domain “is the only practicable method” of
achieving the government objective.292 The “only practicable
method” test is similar to the “least restrictive means” test under
strict scrutiny review in equal protection cases.293 Second, the
government must show that “an asserted public use has a
reasonable chance of accruing in a reasonable amount of time.”294
This prong is a further inquiry into the means that the
government chooses to meet its ends in that it asks about the
anticipated time frame of the public benefit being realized. It “is
designed to deter a condemning authority from asserting a
pretextual public use.”295 Third, the government must
demonstrate that if a private transferee takes the land, then
that “transferee . . . will not receive gratuitously the surplus
value that represents the difference between the pre-
condemnation and post-condemnation values.”296 In the case of
the federal government taking land for a border wall, this prong
289 The Court has noted, “The term ‘narrowly tailored,’ so frequently used in our
cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have
indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of whether lawful alternative
and less restrictive means could have been used.” Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986).
290 See supra Section III.C.1.
291 Lang, supra note 280, at 472. Note that Lang is addressing condemnations
that take property from one private party and give it to another private party. I broaden
the language of the test to apply other exercises of eminent domain.
292 Id.
293 See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (1986) (narrow tailoring requires
“consideration of whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used.”).
294 Lang, supra note 280, at 475 (footnote omitted).
295 Id.
296 Id. at 477.
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will not be relevant unless the government subsequently
conveys the land on which the wall sits to a private entity.297
In applying the most relevant elements of Lang’s strict
scrutiny test to the president’s use of eminent domain to seize
land for a border wall, the government faces significant
challenges. First, the government would need to show that its
proposed border wall is the “only practicable method” of stopping
illegal border crossings or deter crime.298 Much evidence exists
to the contrary.299 Second, the government would have to
demonstrate that the government’s objectives would be met over
a reasonable amount of time. Again, this seems unlikely to be
satisfied.300 Like the converging interests in Brown v. Board of
Education, the interests of the majority and minority have
converged in limiting eminent domain power after Kelo. The
border wall is the next major battle ground in this fight. The
application of strict scrutiny is one possible way forward.
In sum, any of these forms of heightened scrutiny—either
means-ends analysis or strict scrutiny—would be better than the
extreme deference articulated in Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo,
because they would provide a check on unfettered government
decision-making regarding the taking of private property.301Much
is at stake. If Trump succeeds in building the border wall that he
has repeatedly promised his supporters, then potentially
thousands of people from all racial groups will lose their land for
an ill-conceived government plan infused with racial animus that
will do little to benefit the public. As it now stands, federal law
may be on Trump’s side because eminent domain doctrine has
been judicially constructed over the past decades in a way that
makes it far too easy for the federal government to take what it
wants as long as it identifies a legitimate public benefit before the
taking. It does not have to be this way. Even incremental steps in
the proper direction—toward heightened scrutiny in takings
cases—can have significant policy and legal effects over time.
297 In an age of increasing privatization of government functions, the private
ownership and management of the border wall is not beyond the realm of possibilities. See,
e.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2018),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/private-prisons-united-states/ [https://
perma.cc/9DGL-QYYS] (“Private prisons in the United States incarcerated 128,063
people in 2016, representing 8.5% of the total state and federal prison population.”).
298 Lang, supra note 280, at 472.
299 See supra notes 208–218 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 208–218 and accompanying text.
301 The benefits and limitations of each approach are beyond the scope of this
article. The main argument is that a point of interest-convergence has arrived and a
number of possibilities of reforming the law exist that are better than the status quo.
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CONCLUSION
President Donald Trump is seeking to take privately
owned and tribal properties, including people’s homes and
businesses, to build a continuous physical wall along the two
thousand mile border between the United States and Mexico.302
He even partially shut down the government for the longest
period in history in order to pressure Congress to fund his wall.303
Substantial evidence suggests that this massive government
condemnation scheme will not effectuate Trump’s primary
purpose—the stopping of illegal immigration fromMexico. We are
at a unique point in history where the interests of both the
minority and majority have converged on a common goal: to
restrict government power to take private property unless it can
be put to its proof that such taking is justified. The best way
forward involves applying heightened judicial scrutiny in which
the government must justify that its means are connected to its
stated ends. The only way to reform the law in this way is to
embrace this moment of interest-convergence—i.e., acknowledge
an alignment of interests between groups whose interests have
historically diverged and move forward together.
302 See supra notes 20, 24 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
